Last 
month,
 during a lecture at the Grande Oriente Masonic Lodge, in Brasília, a 
Brazilian Army general named Antonio Hamilton Martins Mourão 
said
 that the country’s military leaders had discussed overthrowing the 
government. Corruption investigations have ensnared successive 
Presidential administrations in Brazil, and Mourão said there was a 
limit to the political chaos the armed forces could tolerate. “Either 
the institutions solve the political problem through the courts, 
removing those elements involved in illegal acts from public life, or we
 will have to impose the solution,” he said. Wearing his official 
uniform, his chest laden with decorations, Mourão explained that his 
colleagues in the Army’s high command shared his view. “We have very 
well-made plans,” he went on, before ominously adding, “This solution 
won’t be easy. It will bring trouble, you can be sure of that.” When he 
finished, the audience broke into applause.
Brazil
 is all too familiar with military coups—the last one, in 1964, brought 
on a twenty-one-year dictatorship. Mourão’s speech, then, was troubling 
enough on its own. But his superiors’ reactions were even more 
disturbing. No one in the civilian Administration publicly condemned his
 remarks, and the commander of the Army, General Eduardo Villas Bôas, 
refused to censure his subordinate for violating the prohibition on 
political speech by active officers. Instead, he called Mourão “a great 
soldier.” Confronted by a journalist on TV, he was compelled to weakly 
acknowledge that “dictatorship is never the best” solution, but he only 
doubled down on Mourão’s dark suggestion, saying that the armed forces 
had the constitutional authority to “intervene” when the country finds 
itself “in the imminence of chaos.” As the columnist Josias de Souza 
noted,
 Brazil’s constitution grants the military no such power. That did not 
stop another general, Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva, from making the same 
claim in a newspaper 
op-ed two weeks later.
The
 generals are right about one thing: Brazil is in turmoil, economic and 
political. The country is just barely emerging from the deepest 
recession in its history, and President Michel Temer has been formally 
accused
 of leading a conspiracy to siphon off more than a hundred and eighty 
million dollars from government contracts. His predecessor, Dilma 
Rousseff, was impeached last year for violating budget rules. Dozens of 
lawmakers are facing their own corruption charges, and their cases have 
created a backlog at the Supreme Court—the only court that can try them.
 In the meantime, these lawmakers—politicians of various ideological 
stripes—have united to undermine the power of the judiciary. The phrase 
“the institutions are working,” stubbornly repeated by high officials, 
has become so hard to believe that on social media it now serves as an 
ironic refrain
 to highlight fresh disorder. Many Brazilians have lost faith in 
democracy altogether. In a poll taken after the comments by Mourão and 
Villas Bôas, forty-three per cent of the population said it supported a 
“temporary military intervention.”
The
 1964 coup was also supposed to be temporary. Brazilian generals—backed 
by the U.S. government—framed it as a necessary evil to preserve 
democracy from a Communist takeover. Before long, Presidential elections
 were cancelled, street marches were banned, and Congress periodically 
shut down. Thousands of suspected subversives were tortured, and more 
than four hundred were killed. Today, however, with the country 
registering sixty thousand homicides a year, plenty of Brazilians are 
nostalgic for those days of law and apparent order. Many believe that 
the generals cleansed the nation of graft. In reality, as a government 
truth commission showed in 2014, this perception only reflected the 
regime’s censorship of the press and control of the judiciary. Under the
 dictatorship, kickbacks lubricated Brazil’s political system just as 
they always had.
Still, the 
myth survives, with dangerous implications. Its current embodiment is a 
soldier-turned-congressman, Jair Bolsonaro, who has been polling in 
second place for the 2018 Presidential election. When I spoke to him 
last year, he told me, “The military period was a time of glory for 
Brazil, when criminals were criminals, he who worked was recognized for 
it, and even in soccer we didn’t go through the embarrassment we do 
today, if you look at Germany’s 7–1”—a winking reference to Brazil’s 
epic semifinal loss at the 2014 World Cup. Bolsonaro once told a female 
lawmaker, “I won’t rape you because you don’t deserve it.” He has called
 the Afro-Brazilian communities known as quilombos “worthless even for procreating.” Of the organizers of an L.G.B.T.Q. art show, he said, “Tem que fuzilar os autores dessa exposição”—they
 should be lined up and shot. His solution to Brazil’s crime problem is 
to “give police free rein to kill.” He has cited Donald Trump as a 
political role model.
In a Facebook 
video
 titled “A hug for General Mourão,” recorded after Mourão talked about 
overthrowing the government, Bolsonaro can be seen telling a fervent 
crowd in the city of Belém that the general is a patriot trying to keep 
his country from going under. The post has racked up half a million 
views. A slim majority of Brazilians still oppose an “intervention,” but
 surveys also rank the armed forces as the country’s most-trusted 
institution. Maurício Santoro, a political scientist at the State 
University of Rio de Janeiro, told me that the generals’ remarks may 
help Bolsonaro by recreating the regime-era image of honest soldiers 
crusading against corruption. And the threat of a coup should not be 
taken lightly. “It’s still an outside possibility,” Santoro told me. 
“But for the first time since the return of democracy, it’s on the 
table.”
 
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