October 10, 2021

The Other Afghan Women

 

In the countryside, the endless killing of civilians turned women against the occupiers who claimed to be helping them.By September 6, 2021FacebookTwitterEmailPrintSave StorySave this story for later.

By
Anand Gopal
The New Yorker
 
 

Late one afternoon this past August, Shakira heard banging on her front gate. In the Sangin Valley, which is in Helmand Province, in southern Afghanistan, women must not be seen by men who aren’t related to them, and so her nineteen-year-old son, Ahmed, went to the gate. Outside were two men in bandoliers and black turbans, carrying rifles. They were members of the Taliban, who were waging an offensive to wrest the countryside back from the Afghan National Army. One of the men warned, “If you don’t leave immediately, everyone is going to die.”

Shakira, who is in her early forties, corralled her family: her husband, an opium merchant, who was fast asleep, having succumbed to the temptations of his product, and her eight children, including her oldest, twenty-year-old Nilofar—as old as the war itself—whom Shakira called her “deputy,” because she helped care for the younger ones. The family crossed an old footbridge spanning a canal, then snaked their way through reeds and irregular plots of beans and onions, past dark and vacant houses. Their neighbors had been warned, too, and, except for wandering chickens and orphaned cattle, the village was empty.

Shakira’s family walked for hours under a blazing sun. She started to feel the rattle of distant thuds, and saw people streaming from riverside villages: men bending low beneath bundles stuffed with all that they could not bear to leave behind, women walking as quickly as their burqas allowed.

The pounding of artillery filled the air, announcing the start of a Taliban assault on an Afghan Army outpost. Shakira balanced her youngest child, a two-year-old daughter, on her hip as the sky flashed and thundered. By nightfall, they had come upon the valley’s central market. The corrugated-iron storefronts had largely been destroyed during the war. Shakira found a one-room shop with an intact roof, and her family settled in for the night. For the children, she produced a set of cloth dolls—one of a number of distractions that she’d cultivated during the years of fleeing battle. As she held the figures in the light of a match, the earth shook.

Around dawn, Shakira stepped outside, and saw that a few dozen families had taken shelter in the abandoned market. It had once been the most thriving bazaar in northern Helmand, with shopkeepers weighing saffron and cumin on scales, carts loaded with women’s gowns, and storefronts dedicated to selling opium. Now stray pillars jutted upward, and the air smelled of decaying animal remains and burning plastic.

In the distance, the earth suddenly exploded in fountains of dirt. Helicopters from the Afghan Army buzzed overhead, and the families hid behind the shops, considering their next move. There was fighting along the stone ramparts to the north and the riverbank to the west. To the east was red-sand desert as far as Shakira could see. The only option was to head south, toward the leafy city of Lashkar Gah, which remained under the control of the Afghan government.

The journey would entail cutting through a barren plain exposed to abandoned U.S. and British bases, where snipers nested, and crossing culverts potentially stuffed with explosives. A few families started off. Even if they reached Lashkar Gah, they could not be sure what they’d find there. Since the start of the Taliban’s blitz, Afghan Army soldiers had surrendered in droves, begging for safe passage home. It was clear that the Taliban would soon reach Kabul, and that the twenty years, and the trillions of dollars, devoted to defeating them had come to nothing. Shakira’s family stood in the desert, discussing the situation. The gunfire sounded closer. Shakira spotted Taliban vehicles racing toward the bazaar—and she decided to stay put. She was weary to the bone, her nerves frayed. She would face whatever came next, accept it like a judgment. “We’ve been running all our lives,” she told me. “I’m not going anywhere.”

The longest war in American history ended on August 15th, when the Taliban captured Kabul without firing a shot. Bearded, scraggly men with black turbans took control of the Presidential palace, and around the capital the austere white flags of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan went up. Panic ensued. Some women burned their school records and went into hiding, fearing a return to the nineteen-nineties, when the Taliban forbade them to venture out alone and banned girls’ education. For Americans, the very real possibility that the gains of the past two decades might be erased appeared to pose a dreadful choice: recommit to seemingly endless war, or abandon Afghan women.

This summer, I travelled to rural Afghanistan to meet women who were already living under the Taliban, to listen to what they thought about this looming dilemma. More than seventy per cent of Afghans do not live in cities, and in the past decade the insurgent group had swallowed large swaths of the countryside. Unlike in relatively liberal Kabul, visiting women in these hinterlands is not easy: even without Taliban rule, women traditionally do not speak to unrelated men. Public and private worlds are sharply divided, and when a woman leaves her home she maintains a cocoon of seclusion through the burqa, which predates the Taliban by centuries. Girls essentially disappear into their homes at puberty, emerging only as grandmothers, if ever. It was through grandmothers—finding each by referral, and speaking to many without seeing their faces—that I was able to meet dozens of women, of all ages. Many were living in desert tents or hollowed-out storefronts, like Shakira; when the Taliban came across her family hiding at the market, the fighters advised them and others not to return home until someone could sweep for mines. I first encountered her in a safe house in Helmand. “I’ve never met a foreigner before,” she said shyly. “Well, a foreigner without a gun.”

Shakira has a knack for finding humor in pathos, and in the sheer absurdity of the men in her life: in the nineties, the Taliban had offered to supply electricity to the village, and the local graybeards had initially refused, fearing black magic. “Of course, we women knew electricity was fine,” she said, chuckling. When she laughs, she pulls her shawl over her face, leaving only her eyes exposed. I told her that she shared a name with a world-renowned pop star, and her eyes widened. “Is it true?” she asked a friend who’d accompanied her to the safe house. “Could it be?”

Shakira, like the other women I met, grew up in the Sangin Valley, a gash of green between sharp mountain outcrops. The valley is watered by the Helmand River and by a canal that Americans built in the nineteen-fifties. You can walk the width of the dale in an hour, passing dozens of tiny hamlets, creaking footbridges, and mud-brick walls. As a girl, Shakira heard stories from her mother of the old days in her village, Pan Killay, which was home to about eighty families: the children swimming in the canal under the warm sun, the women pounding grain in stone mortars. In winter, smoke wafted from clay hearths; in spring, rolling fields were blanketed with poppies.

In 1979, when Shakira was an infant, Communists seized power in Kabul and tried to launch a female-literacy program in Helmand—a province the size of West Virginia, with few girls’ schools. Tribal elders and landlords refused. In the villagers’ retelling, the traditional way of life in Sangin was smashed overnight, because outsiders insisted on bringing women’s rights to the valley. “Our culture could not accept sending their girls outside to school,” Shakira recalled. “It was this way before my father’s time, before my grandfather’s time.” When the authorities began forcing girls to attend classes at gunpoint, a rebellion erupted, led by armed men calling themselves the mujahideen. In their first operation, they kidnapped all the schoolteachers in the valley, many of whom supported girls’ education, and slit their throats. The next day, the government arrested tribal elders and landlords on the suspicion that they were bankrolling the mujahideen. These community leaders were never seen again.

Tanks from the Soviet Union crossed the border to shore up the Communist government—and to liberate women. Soon, Afghanistan was basically split in two. In the countryside, where young men were willing to die fighting the imposition of new ways of life—including girls’ schools and land reform—young women remained unseen. In the cities, the Soviet-backed government banned child marriage and granted women the right to choose their partners. Girls enrolled in schools and universities in record numbers, and by the early eighties women held parliamentary seats and even the office of Vice-President.

The violence in the countryside continued to spread. Early one morning when Shakira was five, her aunt awakened her in a great hurry. The children were led by the adults of the village to a mountain cave, where they huddled for hours. At night, Shakira watched artillery streak the sky. When the family returned to Pan Killay, the wheat fields were charred, and crisscrossed with the tread marks of Soviet tanks. The cows had been mowed down with machine guns. Everywhere she looked, she saw neighbors—men she used to call “uncle”—lying bloodied. Her grandfather hadn’t hidden with her, and she couldn’t find him in the village. When she was older, she learned that he’d gone to a different cave, and had been caught and executed by the Soviets.

Nighttime evacuations became a frequent occurrence and, for Shakira, a source of excitement: the dark corners of the caves, the clamorous groups of children. “We would look for Russian helicopters,” she said. “It was like spotting strange birds.” Sometimes, those birds swooped low, the earth exploded, and the children rushed to the site to forage for iron, which could be sold for a good price. Occasionally she gathered metal shards so that she could build a doll house. Once, she showed her mother a magazine photograph of a plastic doll that exhibited the female form; her mother snatched it away, calling it inappropriate. So Shakira learned to make dolls out of cloth and sticks.

When she was eleven, she stopped going outside. Her world shrank to the three rooms of her house and the courtyard, where she learned to sew, bake bread in a tandoor, and milk cows. One day, passing jets rattled the house, and she took sanctuary in a closet. Underneath a pile of clothes, she discovered a child’s alphabet book that had belonged to her grandfather—the last person in the family to attend school. During the afternoons, while her parents napped, she began matching the Pashto words to pictures. She recalled, “I had a plan to teach myself a little every day.”

In 1989, the Soviets withdrew in defeat, but Shakira continued to hear the pounding of mortars outside the house’s mud walls. Competing mujahideen factions were now trying to carve up the country for themselves. Villages like Pan Killay were lucrative targets: there were farmers to tax, rusted Soviet tanks to salvage, opium to export. Pazaro, a woman from a nearby village, recalled, “We didn’t have a single night of peace. Our terror had a name, and it was Amir Dado.”

The first time Shakira saw Dado, through the judas of her parents’ front gate, he was in a pickup truck, trailed by a dozen armed men, parading through the village “as if he were the President.” Dado, a wealthy fruit vender turned mujahideen commander, with a jet-black beard and a prodigious belly, had begun attacking rival strongmen even before the Soviets’ defeat. He hailed from the upper Sangin Valley, where his tribe, the Alikozais, had held vast feudal plantations for centuries. The lower valley was the home of the Ishaqzais, the poor tribe to which Shakira belonged. Shakira watched as Dado’s men went from door to door, demanding a “tax” and searching homes. A few weeks later, the gunmen returned, ransacking her family’s living room while she cowered in a corner. Never before had strangers violated the sanctity of her home, and she felt as if she’d been stripped naked and thrown into the street.

By the early nineties, the Communist government of Afghanistan, now bereft of Soviet support, was crumbling. In 1992, Lashkar Gah fell to a faction of mujahideen. Shakira had an uncle living there, a Communist with little time for the mosque and a weakness for Pashtun tunes. He’d recently married a young woman, Sana, who’d escaped a forced betrothal to a man four times her age. The pair had started a new life in Little Moscow, a Lashkar Gah neighborhood that Sana called “the land where women have freedom”—but, when the mujahideen took over, they were forced to flee to Pan Killay.

Shakira was tending the cows one evening when Dado’s men surrounded her with guns. “Where’s your uncle?” one of them shouted. The fighters stormed into the house—followed by Sana’s spurned fiancé. “She’s the one!” he said. The gunmen dragged Sana away. When Shakira’s other uncles tried to intervene, they were arrested. The next day, Sana’s husband turned himself in to Dado’s forces, begging to be taken in her place. Both were sent to the strongman’s religious court and sentenced to death.

Not long afterward, the mujahideen toppled the Communists in Kabul, and they brought their countryside mores with them. In the capital, their leaders—who had received generous amounts of U.S. funding—issued a decree declaring that “women are not to leave their homes at all, unless absolutely necessary, in which case they are to cover themselves completely.” Women were likewise banned from “walking gracefully or with pride.” Religious police began roaming the city’s streets, arresting women and burning audio- and videocassettes on pyres.

Yet the new mujahideen government quickly fell apart, and the country descended into civil war. At night in Pan Killay, Shakira heard gunfire and, sometimes, the shouts of men. In the morning, while tending the cows, she’d see neighbors carrying wrapped bodies. Her family gathered in the courtyard and discussed, in low voices, how they might escape. But the roads were studded with checkpoints belonging to different mujahideen groups. South of the village, in the town of Gereshk, a militia called the Ninety-third Division maintained a particularly notorious barricade on a bridge; there were stories of men getting robbed or killed, of women and young boys being raped. Shakira’s father sometimes crossed the bridge to sell produce at the Gereshk market, and her mother started pleading with him to stay home.

The family, penned between Amir Dado to the north and the Ninety-third Division to the south, was growing desperate. Then one afternoon, when Shakira was sixteen, she heard shouts from the street: “The Taliban are here!” She saw a convoy of white Toyota Hiluxes filled with black-turbanned fighters carrying white flags. Shakira hadn’t ever heard of the Taliban, but her father explained that its members were much like the poor religious students she’d seen all her life begging for alms. Many had fought under the mujahideen’s banner but quit after the Soviets’ withdrawal; now, they said, they were remobilizing to put an end to the tumult. In short order, they had stormed the Gereshk bridge, dismantling the Ninety-third Division, and volunteers had flocked to join them as they’d descended on Sangin. Her brother came home reporting that the Taliban had also overrun Dado’s positions. The warlord had abandoned his men and fled to Pakistan. “He’s gone,” Shakira’s brother kept saying. “He really is.” The Taliban soon dissolved Dado’s religious court—freeing Sana and her husband, who were awaiting execution—and eliminated the checkpoints. After fifteen years, the Sangin Valley was finally at peace.

When I asked Shakira and other women from the valley to reflect on Taliban rule, they were unwilling to judge the movement against some universal standard—only against what had come before. “They were softer,” Pazaro, the woman who lived in a neighboring village, said. “They were dealing with us respectfully.” The women described their lives under the Taliban as identical to their lives under Dado and the mujahideen—minus the strangers barging through the doors at night, the deadly checkpoints.

Shakira recounted to me a newfound serenity: quiet mornings with steaming green tea and naan bread, summer evenings on the rooftop. Mothers and aunts and grandmothers began to discreetly inquire about her eligibility; in the village, marriage was a bond uniting two families. She was soon betrothed to a distant relative whose father had vanished, presumably at the hands of the Soviets. The first time she laid eyes on her fiancé was on their wedding day: he was sitting sheepishly, surrounded by women of the village, who were ribbing him about his plans for the wedding night. “Oh, he was a fool!” Shakira recalled, laughing. “He was so embarrassed, he tried to run away. People had to catch him and bring him back.”

Like many enterprising young men in the valley, he was employed in opium trafficking, and Shakira liked the glint of determination in his eyes. Yet she started to worry that grit alone might not be enough. As Taliban rule established itself, a conscription campaign was launched. Young men were taken to northern Afghanistan, to help fight against a gang of mujahideen warlords known as the Northern Alliance. One day, Shakira watched a helicopter alight in a field and unload the bodies of fallen conscripts. Men in the valley began hiding in friends’ houses, moving from village to village, terrified of being called up. Impoverished tenant farmers were the most at risk—the rich could buy their way out of service. “This was the true injustice of the Taliban,” Shakira told me. She grew to loathe the sight of roving Taliban patrols.

In 2000, Helmand Province experienced punishing drought. The watermelon fields lay ruined, and the bloated corpses of draft animals littered the roads. In a flash of cruelty, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar, chose that moment to ban opium cultivation. The valley’s economy collapsed. Pazaro recalled, “We had nothing to eat, the land gave us nothing, and our men couldn’t provide for our children. The children were crying, they were screaming, and we felt like we’d failed.” Shakira, who was pregnant, dipped squares of stale naan into green tea to feed her nieces and nephews. Her husband left for Pakistan, to try his luck in the fields there. Shakira was stricken by the thought that her baby would emerge lifeless, that her husband would never return, that she would be alone. Every morning, she prayed for rain, for deliverance.

One day, an announcer on the radio said that there had been an attack in America. Suddenly, there was talk that soldiers from the richest country on earth were coming to overthrow the Taliban. For the first time in years, Shakira’s heart stirred with hope.

One night in 2003, Shakira was jolted awake by the voices of strange men. She rushed to cover herself. When she ran to the living room, she saw, with panic, the muzzles of rifles being pointed at her. The men were larger than she’d ever seen, and they were in uniform. These are the Americans, she realized, in awe. Some Afghans were with them, scrawny men with Kalashnikovs and checkered scarves. A man with an enormous beard was barking orders: Amir Dado.

The U.S. had swiftly toppled the Taliban following its invasion, installing in Kabul the government of Hamid Karzai. Dado, who had befriended American Special Forces, became the chief of intelligence for Helmand Province. One of his brothers was the governor of the Sangin district, and another brother became Sangin’s chief of police. In Helmand, the first year of the American occupation had been peaceful, and the fields once again burst with poppies. Shakira now had two small children, Nilofar and Ahmed. Her husband had returned from Pakistan and found work ferrying bags of opium resin to the Sangin market. But now, with Dado back in charge—rescued from exile by the Americans—life regressed to the days of civil war.

Nearly every person Shakira knew had a story about Dado. Once, his fighters demanded that two young men either pay a tax or join his private militia, which he maintained despite holding his official post. When they refused, his fighters beat them to death, stringing their bodies up from a tree. A villager recalled, “We went to cut them down, and they had been sliced open, their stomachs coming out.” In another village, Dado’s forces went from house to house, executing people suspected of being Taliban; an elderly scholar who’d never belonged to the movement was shot dead.

Shakira was bewildered by the Americans’ choice of allies. “Was this their plan?” she asked me. “Did they come to bring peace, or did they have other aims?” She insisted that her husband stop taking resin to the Sangin market, so he shifted his trade south, to Gereshk. But he returned one afternoon with the news that this, too, had become impossible. Astonishingly, the United States had resuscitated the Ninety-third Division—and made it its closest partner in the province. The Division’s gunmen again began stopping travellers on the bridge and plundering what they could. Now, however, their most profitable endeavor was collecting bounties offered by the U.S.; according to Mike Martin, a former British officer who wrote a history of Helmand, they earned up to two thousand dollars per Taliban commander captured.

This posed a challenge, though, because there were hardly any active Taliban to catch. “We knew who were the Taliban in our village,” Shakira said, and they weren’t engaged in guerrilla warfare: “They were all sitting at home, doing nothing.” A lieutenant colonel with U.S. Special Forces, Stuart Farris, who was deployed to the area at that time, told a U.S. Army historian, “There was virtually no resistance on this rotation.” So militias like the Ninety-third Division began accusing innocent people. In February, 2003, they branded Hajji Bismillah—the Karzai government’s transportation director for Gereshk, responsible for collecting tolls in the city—a terrorist, prompting the Americans to ship him to Guantánamo. With Bismillah eliminated, the Ninety-third Division monopolized the toll revenue.

Dado went even further. In March, 2003, U.S. soldiers visited Sangin’s governor—Dado’s brother—to discuss refurbishing a school and a health clinic. Upon leaving, their convoy came under fire, and Staff Sergeant Jacob Frazier and Sergeant Orlando Morales became the first American combat fatalities in Helmand. U.S. personnel suspected that the culprit was not the Taliban but Dado—a suspicion confirmed to me by one of the warlord’s former commanders, who said that his boss had engineered the attack to keep the Americans reliant on him. Nonetheless, when Dado’s forces claimed to have nabbed the true assassin—an ex-Taliban conscript named Mullah Jalil—the Americans dispatched Jalil to Guantánamo. Unaccountably, this happened despite the fact that, according to Jalil’s classified Guantánamo file, U.S. officials knew that Jalil had been fingered merely to “cover for” the fact that Dado’s forces had been “involved with the ambush.”

The incident didn’t affect Dado’s relationship with U.S. Special Forces, who deemed him too valuable in serving up “terrorists.” They were now patrolling together, and soon after the attack the joint operation searched Shakira’s village for suspected terrorists. The soldiers did not stay at her home long, but she could not get the sight of the rifle muzzles out of her mind. The next morning, she removed the rugs and scrubbed the boot marks away.

Shakira’s friends and neighbors were too terrified to speak out, but the United Nations began agitating for Dado’s removal. The U.S. repeatedly blocked the effort, and a guide for the U.S. Marine Corps argued that although Dado was “far from being a Jeffersonian Democrat” his form of rough justice was “the time-tested solution for controlling rebellious Pashtuns.”

Shakira’s husband stopped leaving the house as Helmandis continued to be taken away on flimsy pretexts. A farmer in a nearby village, Mohammed Nasim, was arrested by U.S. forces and sent to Guantánamo because, according to a classified assessment, his name was similar to that of a Taliban commander. A Karzai government official named Ehsanullah visited an American base to inform on two Taliban members; no translator was present, and, in the confusion, he was arrested himself and shipped to Guantánamo. Nasrullah, a government tax collector, was sent to Guantánamo after being randomly pulled off a bus following a skirmish between U.S. Special Forces and local tribesmen. “We were so happy with the Americans,” he said later, at a military tribunal. “I didn’t know eventually I would come to Cuba.”

Nasrullah ultimately returned home, but some detainees never made it back. Abdul Wahid, of Gereshk, was arrested by the Ninety-third Division and beaten severely; he was delivered to U.S. custody and left in a cage, where he died. U.S. military personnel noted burns on his chest and stomach, and bruising to his hips and groin. According to a declassified investigation, Special Forces soldiers reported that Wahid’s wounds were consistent with “a normal interview/interrogation method” used by the Ninety-third Division. A sergeant stated that he “could provide photographs of prior detainees with similar injuries.” Nonetheless, the U.S. continued to support the Ninety-third Division—a violation of the Leahy Law, which bars American personnel from knowingly backing units that commit flagrant human-rights abuses.

In 2004, the U.N. launched a program to disarm pro-government militias. A Ninety-third commander learned of the plan and rebranded a segment of the militia as a “private-security company” under contract with the Americans, enabling roughly a third of the Division’s fighters to remain armed. Another third kept their weapons by signing a contract with a Texas-based firm to protect road-paving crews. (When the Karzai government replaced these private guards with police, the Ninety-third’s leader engineered a hit that killed fifteen policemen, and then recovered the contract.) The remaining third of the Division, finding themselves subjected to extortion threats from their former colleagues, absconded with their weapons and joined the Taliban.

Messaging by the U.S.-led coalition tended to portray the growing rebellion as a matter of extremists battling freedom, but nato documents I obtained conceded that Ishaqzais had “no good reason” to trust the coalition forces, having suffered “oppression at the hands of Dad Mohammad Khan,” or Amir Dado. In Pan Killay, elders encouraged their sons to take up arms to protect the village, and some reached out to former Taliban members. Shakira wished that her husband would do something—help guard the village, or move them to Pakistan—but he demurred. In a nearby village, when U.S. forces raided the home of a beloved tribal elder, killing him and leaving his son with paraplegia, women shouted at their menfolk, “You people have big turbans on your heads, but what have you done? You can’t even protect us. You call yourselves men?”

It was now 2005, four years after the American invasion, and Shakira had a third child on the way. Her domestic duties consumed her—“morning to night, I was working and sweating”—but when she paused from stoking the tandoor or pruning the peach trees she realized that she’d lost the sense of promise she’d once felt. Nearly every week, she heard of another young man being spirited away by the Americans or the militias. Her husband was unemployed, and recently he’d begun smoking opium. Their marriage soured. An air of mistrust settled onto the house, matching the village’s grim mood.

So when a Taliban convoy rolled into Pan Killay, with black-turbanned men hoisting tall white flags, she considered the visitors with interest, even forgiveness. This time, she thought, things might be different.

In 2006, the U.K. joined a growing contingent of U.S. Special Operations Forces working to quell the rebellion in Sangin. Soon, Shakira recalled, “hell began.” The Taliban attacked patrols, launched raids on combat outposts, and set up roadblocks. On a hilltop in Pan Killay, the Americans commandeered a drug lord’s house, transforming it into a compound of sandbags and watchtowers and concertina wire. Before most battles, young Talibs visited houses, warning residents to leave immediately. Then the Taliban would launch their assault, the coalition would respond, and the earth would shudder.

Sometimes, even fleeing did not guarantee safety. During one battle, Abdul Salam, an uncle of Shakira’s husband, took refuge in a friend’s home. After the fighting ended, he visited a mosque to offer prayers. A few Taliban were there, too. A coalition air strike killed almost everyone inside. The next day, mourners gathered for funerals; a second strike killed a dozen more people. Among the bodies returned to Pan Killay were those of Abdul Salam, his cousin, and his three nephews, aged six to fifteen.

Not since childhood had Shakira known anyone who’d died by air strike. She was now twenty-seven, and she slept fitfully, as if at any moment she’d need to run for cover. One night, she awoke to a screeching noise so loud that she wondered if the house was being torn apart. Her husband was still snoring away, and she cursed him under her breath. She tiptoed to the front yard. Coalition military vehicles were passing by, trundling over scrap metal strewn out front. She roused the family. It was too late to evacuate, and Shakira prayed that the Taliban would not attack. She thrust the children into recessed windows—a desperate attempt to protect them in case a strike caused the roof to collapse—and covered them with heavy blankets.

Returning to the front yard, Shakira spotted one of the foreigners’ vehicles sitting motionless. A pair of antennas projected skyward. They’re going to kill us, she thought. She climbed onto the roof, and saw that the vehicle was empty: the soldiers had parked it and left on foot. She watched them march over the footbridge and disappear into the reeds.

A few fields away, the Taliban and the foreigners began firing. For hours, the family huddled indoors. The walls shook, and the children cried. Shakira brought out her cloth dolls, rocked Ahmed against her chest, and whispered stories. When the guns fell silent, around dawn, Shakira went out for another look. The vehicle remained there, unattended. She was shaking in anger. All year, roughly once a month, she had been subjected to this terror. The Taliban had launched the attack, but most of her rage was directed at the interlopers. Why did she, and her children, have to suffer?

A wild thought flashed through her head. She rushed into the house and spoke with her mother-in-law. The soldiers were still on the far side of the canal. Shakira found some matches and her mother-in-law grabbed a jerrican of diesel fuel. On the street, a neighbor glanced at the jerrican and understood, hurrying back with a second jug. Shakira’s mother-in-law doused a tire, then popped the hood and soaked the engine. Shakira struck a match, and dropped it onto the tire.

From the house, they watched the sky turn ashen from the blaze. Before long, they heard the whirring of a helicopter, approaching from the south. “It’s coming for us!” her mother-in-law shouted. Shakira’s brother-in-law, who was staying with them, frantically gathered the children, but Shakira knew that it was too late. If we’re going to die, let’s die at home, she thought.

They threw themselves into a shallow trench in the back yard, the adults on top of the children. The earth shook violently, then the helicopter flew off. When they emerged, Shakira saw that the foreigners had targeted the burning vehicle, so that none of its parts would fall into enemy hands.

The women of Pan Killay came to congratulate Shakira; she was, as one woman put it, “a hero.” But she had difficulty mustering any pride, only relief. “I was thinking that they would not come here anymore,” she said. “And we would have peace.”

In 2008, the U.S. Marines deployed to Sangin, reinforcing American Special Forces and U.K. soldiers. Britain’s forces were beleaguered—a third of its casualties in Afghanistan would occur in Sangin, leading some soldiers to dub the mission “Sangingrad.” Nilofar, now eight, could intuit the rhythms of wartime. She would ask Shakira, “When are we going to Auntie Farzana’s house?” Farzana lived in the desert.

But the chaos wasn’t always predictable: one afternoon, the foreigners again appeared before anyone could flee, and the family rushed into the back-yard trench. A few doors down, the wife and children of the late Abdul Salam did the same, but a mortar killed his fifteen-year-old daughter, Bor Jana.

Both sides of the war did make efforts to avoid civilian deaths. In addition to issuing warnings to evacuate, the Taliban kept villagers informed about which areas were seeded with improvised explosive devices, and closed roads to civilian traffic when targeting convoys. The coalition deployed laser-guided bombs, used loudspeakers to warn villagers of fighting, and dispatched helicopters ahead of battle. “They would drop leaflets saying, ‘Stay in your homes! Save yourselves!’ ” Shakira recalled. In a war waged in mud-walled warrens teeming with life, however, nowhere was truly safe, and an extraordinary number of civilians died. Sometimes, such casualties sparked widespread condemnation, as when a nato rocket struck a crowd of villagers in Sangin in 2010, killing fifty-two. But the vast majority of incidents involved one or two deaths—anonymous lives that were never reported on, never recorded by official organizations, and therefore never counted as part of the war’s civilian toll.

In this way, Shakira’s tragedies mounted. There was Muhammad, a fifteen-year-old cousin: he was killed by a buzzbuzzak, a drone, while riding his motorcycle through the village with a friend. “That sound was everywhere,” Shakira recalled. “When we heard it, the children would start to cry, and I could not console them.”

Muhammad Wali, an adult cousin: Villagers were instructed by coalition forces to stay indoors for three days as they conducted an operation, but after the second day drinking water had been depleted and Wali was forced to venture out. He was shot.

Khan Muhammad, a seven-year-old cousin: His family was fleeing a clash by car when it mistakenly neared a coalition position; the car was strafed, killing him.

Bor Agha, a twelve-year-old cousin: He was taking an evening walk when he was killed by fire from an Afghan National Police base. The next morning, his father visited the base, in shock and looking for answers, and was told that the boy had been warned before not to stray near the installation. “Their commander gave the order to target him,” his father recalled.

Amanullah, a sixteen-year-old cousin: He was working the land when he was targeted by an Afghan Army sniper. No one provided an explanation, and the family was too afraid to approach the Army base and ask.

Ahmed, an adult cousin: After a long day in the fields, he was headed home, carrying a hot plate, when he was struck down by coalition forces. The family believes that the foreigners mistook the hot plate for an I.E.D.

Niamatullah, Ahmed’s brother: He was harvesting opium when a firefight broke out nearby; as he tried to flee, he was gunned down by a buzzbuzzak.

Gul Ahmed, an uncle of Shakira’s husband: He wanted to get a head start on his day, so he asked his sons to bring his breakfast to the fields. When they arrived, they found his body. Witnesses said that he’d encountered a coalition patrol. The soldiers “left him here, like an animal,” Shakira said.

Entire branches of Shakira’s family tree, from the uncles who used to tell her stories to the cousins who played with her in the caves, vanished. In all, she lost sixteen family members. I wondered if it was the same for other families in Pan Killay. I sampled a dozen households at random in the village, and made similar inquiries in other villages, to insure that Pan Killay was no outlier. For each family, I documented the names of the dead, cross-checking cases with death certificates and eyewitness testimony. On average, I found, each family lost ten to twelve civilians in what locals call the American War.

This scale of suffering was unknown in a bustling metropolis like Kabul, where citizens enjoyed relative security. But in countryside enclaves like Sangin the ceaseless killings of civilians led many Afghans to gravitate toward the Taliban. By 2010, many households in Ishaqzai villages had sons in the Taliban, most of whom had joined simply to protect themselves or to take revenge; the movement was more thoroughly integrated into Sangin life than it had been in the nineties. Now, when Shakira and her friends discussed the Taliban, they were discussing their own friends, neighbors, and loved ones.

Some British officers on the ground grew concerned that the U.S. was killing too many civilians, and unsuccessfully lobbied to have American Special Forces removed from the area. Instead, troops from around the world poured into Helmand, including Australians, Canadians, and Danes. But villagers couldn’t tell the difference—to them, the occupiers were simply “Americans.” Pazaro, the woman from a nearby village, recalled, “There were two types of people—one with black faces and one with pink faces. When we see them, we get terrified.” The coalition portrayed locals as hungering for liberation from the Taliban, but a classified intelligence report from 2011 described community perceptions of coalition forces as “unfavorable,” with villagers warning that, if the coalition “did not leave the area, the local nationals would be forced to evacuate.”

In response, the coalition shifted to the hearts-and-minds strategy of counter-insurgency. But the foreigners’ efforts to embed among the population could be crude: they often occupied houses, only further exposing villagers to crossfire. “They were coming by force, without getting permission from us,” Pashtana, a woman from another Sangin village, told me. “They sometimes broke into our house, broke all the windows, and stayed the whole night. We would have to flee, in case the Taliban fired on them.” Marzia, a woman from Pan Killay, recalled, “The Taliban would fire a few shots, but the Americans would respond with mortars.” One mortar slammed into her mother-in-law’s house. She survived, Marzia said, but had since “lost control of herself”—always “shouting at things we can’t see, at ghosts.”

With the hearts-and-minds approach floundering, some nato officials tried to persuade Taliban commanders to flip. In 2010, a group of Sangin Taliban commanders, liaising with the British, promised to switch sides in return for assistance to local communities. But, when the Taliban leaders met to hammer out their end of the deal, U.S. Special Operations Forces—acting independently—bombed the gathering, killing the top Taliban figure behind the peace overture.

The Marines finally quit Sangin in 2014; the Afghan Army held its ground for three years, until the Taliban had brought most of the valley under its control. The U.S. airlifted Afghan Army troops out and razed many government compounds—leaving, as a nato statement described approvingly, only “rubble and dirt.” The Sangin market had been obliterated in this way. When Shakira first saw the ruined shops, she told her husband, “They left nothing for us.”

Still, a sense of optimism took hold in Pan Killay. Shakira’s husband slaughtered a sheep to celebrate the end of the war, and the family discussed renovating the garden. Her mother-in-law spoke of the days before the Russians and the Americans, when families picnicked along the canal, men stretched out in the shade of peach trees, and women dozed on rooftops under the stars.

But in 2019, as the U.S. was holding talks with Taliban leaders in Doha, Qatar, the Afghan government and American forces moved jointly on Sangin one last time. That January, they launched perhaps the most devastating assault that the valley witnessed in the entire war. Shakira and other villagers fled for the desert, but not everyone could escape. Ahmed Noor Mohammad, who owned a pay-phone business, decided to wait to evacuate, because his twin sons were ill. His family went to bed to the sound of distant artillery. That night, an American bomb slammed into the room where the twin boys were sleeping, killing them. A second bomb hit an adjacent room, killing Mohammad’s father and many others, eight of them children.

The next day, at the funeral, another air strike killed six mourners. In a nearby village, a gunship struck down three children. The following day, four more children were shot dead. Elsewhere in Sangin, an air strike hit an Islamic school, killing a child. A week later, twelve guests at a wedding were killed in an air raid.

After the bombing, Mohammad’s brother travelled to Kandahar to report the massacres to the United Nations and to the Afghan government. When no justice was forthcoming, he joined the Taliban.

On the strength of a seemingly endless supply of recruits, the Taliban had no difficulty outlasting the coalition. But, though the insurgency has finally brought peace to the Afghan countryside, it is a peace of desolation: many villages are in ruins. Reconstruction will be a challenge, but a bigger trial will be to exorcise memories of the past two decades. “My daughter wakes up screaming that the Americans are coming,” Pazaro said. “We have to keep talking to her softly, and tell her, ‘No, no, they won’t come back.’ ”

The Taliban call their domain the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and claim that, once the foreigners are gone, they will preside over an era of tranquil stability. As the Afghan government crumbled this summer, I travelled through Helmand Province—the Emirate’s de-facto capital—to see what a post-American Afghanistan might look like.

I departed from Lashkar Gah, which remained under government control. At the outskirts stood a squat cement building with an Afghan-government flag—beyond this checkpoint, Kabul’s authority vanished. A pickup idled nearby; piled into the cargo bed were half a dozen members of the sangorian, a feared militia in the pay of the Afghan intelligence agency, which was backed by the C.I.A. Two of the fighters appeared no older than twelve.

I was with two locals in a beat-up Corolla, and we slipped past the checkpoint without notice. Soon, we were in a treeless horizon of baked earth, with virtually no road beneath us. We passed abandoned outposts of the Afghan Army and Police that had been built by the Americans and the Brits. Beyond them loomed a series of circular mud fortifications, with a lone Taliban sniper splayed on his stomach. White flags fluttered behind him, announcing the gateway to the Islamic Emirate.

The most striking difference between Taliban country and the world we’d left behind was the dearth of gunmen. In Afghanistan, I’d grown accustomed to kohl-eyed policemen in baggy trousers, militiamen in balaclavas, intelligence agents inspecting cars. Yet we rarely crossed a Taliban checkpoint, and when we did the fighters desultorily examined the car. “Everyone is afraid of the Taliban,” my driver said, laughing. “The checkpoints are in our hearts.”

If people feared their new rulers, they also fraternized with them. Here and there, groups of villagers sat under roadside trellises, sipping tea with Talibs. The country opened up as we jounced along a dirt road in rural Sangin. In the canal, boys were having swimming races; village men and Taliban were dipping their feet into the turquoise water. We passed green cropland and canopies of fruit trees. Groups of women walked along a market road, and two girls skipped in rumpled frocks.

We approached Gereshk, then under government authority. Because the town was the most lucrative toll-collection point in the region, it was said that whoever held it controlled all of Helmand. The Taliban had launched an assault, and the thuds of artillery resounded across the plain. A stream of families, their donkeys laboring under the weight of giant bundles, were escaping what they said were air strikes. By the roadside, a woman in a powder-blue burqa stood with a wheelbarrow; inside was a wrapped body. Some Taliban were gathered on a hilltop, lowering a fallen comrade into a grave.

I met Wakil, a bespectacled Taliban commander. Like many fighters I’d encountered, he came from a line of farmers, had studied a few years in seminary, and had lost dozens of relatives to Amir Dado, the Ninety-third Division, and the Americans. He discussed the calamities visited on his family without rancor, as if the American War were the natural order of things. Thirty years old, he’d attained his rank after an older brother, a Taliban commander, died in battle. He’d hardly ever left Helmand, and his face lit up with wonder at the thought of capturing Gereshk, a town that he’d lived within miles of, but had not been able to visit for twenty years. “Forget your writing,” he laughed as I scribbled notes. “Come watch me take the city!” Tracking a helicopter gliding across the horizon, I declined. He raced off. An hour later, an image popped up on my phone of Wakil pulling down a poster of a government figure linked to the Ninety-third Division. Gereshk had fallen.

At the house of the Taliban district governor, a group of Talibs sat eating okra and naan, donated by the village. I asked them about their plans for when the war was over. Most said that they’d return to farming, or pursue religious education. I’d flown to Afghanistan from Iraq, a fact that impressed Hamid, a young commander. He said that he dreamed of seeing the Babylonian ruins, and asked, “Do you think, when this is over, they’ll give me a visa?”

It was clear that the Taliban are divided about what happens next. During my visit, dozens of members from different parts of Afghanistan offered strikingly contrasting visions for their Emirate. Politically minded Talibs who have lived abroad and maintain homes in Doha or Pakistan told me—perhaps with calculation—that they had a more cosmopolitan outlook than before. A scholar who’d spent much of the past two decades shuttling between Helmand and Pakistan said, “There were many mistakes we made in the nineties. Back then, we didn’t know about human rights, education, politics—we just took everything by power. But now we understand.” In the scholar’s rosy scenario, the Taliban will share ministries with former enemies, girls will attend school, and women will work “shoulder to shoulder” with men.

Yet in Helmand it was hard to find this kind of Talib. More typical was Hamdullah, a narrow-faced commander who lost a dozen family members in the American War, and has measured his life by weddings, funerals, and battles. He said that his community had suffered too grievously to ever share power, and that the maelstrom of the previous twenty years offered only one solution: the status quo ante. He told me, with pride, that he planned to join the Taliban’s march to Kabul, a city he’d never seen. He guessed that he’d arrive there in mid-August.

On the most sensitive question in village life—women’s rights—men like him have not budged. In many parts of rural Helmand, women are barred from visiting the market. When a Sangin woman recently bought cookies for her children at the bazaar, the Taliban beat her, her husband, and the shopkeeper. Taliban members told me that they planned to allow girls to attend madrassas, but only until puberty. As before, women would be prohibited from employment, except for midwifery. Pazaro said, ruefully, “They haven’t changed at all.”

Travelling through Helmand, I could hardly see any signs of the Taliban as a state. Unlike other rebel movements, the Taliban had provided practically no reconstruction, no social services beyond its harsh tribunals. It brooks no opposition: in Pan Killay, the Taliban executed a villager named Shaista Gul after learning that he’d offered bread to members of the Afghan Army. Nevertheless, many Helmandis seemed to prefer Taliban rule—including the women I interviewed. It was as if the movement had won only by default, through the abject failures of its opponents. To locals, life under the coalition forces and their Afghan allies was pure hazard; even drinking tea in a sunlit field, or driving to your sister’s wedding, was a potentially deadly gamble. What the Taliban offered over their rivals was a simple bargain: Obey us, and we will not kill you.

This grim calculus hovered over every conversation I had with villagers. In the hamlet of Yakh Chal, I came upon the ruins of an Afghan Army outpost that had recently been overrun by the Taliban. All that remained were mounds of scrap metal, cords, hot plates, gravel. The next morning, villagers descended on the outpost, scavenging for something to sell. Abdul Rahman, a farmer, was rooting through the refuse with his young son when an Afghan Army gunship appeared on the horizon. It was flying so low, he recalled, that “even Kalashnikovs could fire on it.” But there were no Taliban around, only civilians. The gunship fired, and villagers began falling right and left. It then looped back, continuing to attack. “There were many bodies on the ground, bleeding and moaning,” another witness said. “Many small children.” According to villagers, at least fifty civilians were killed.

Later, I spoke on the phone with an Afghan Army helicopter pilot who had just relieved the one who attacked the outpost. He told me, “I asked the crew why they did this, and they said, ‘We knew they were civilians, but Camp Bastion’ ”—a former British base that had been handed over to the Afghans—“ ‘gave orders to kill them all.’ ” As we spoke, Afghan Army helicopters were firing upon the crowded central market in Gereshk, killing scores of civilians. An official with an international organization based in Helmand said, “When the government forces lose an area, they are taking revenge on the civilians.” The helicopter pilot acknowledged this, adding, “We are doing it on the order of Sami Sadat.”

General Sami Sadat headed one of the seven corps of the Afghan Army. Unlike the Amir Dado generation of strongmen, who were provincial and illiterate, Sadat obtained a master’s degree in strategic management and leadership from a school in the U.K. and studied at the nato Military Academy, in Munich. He held his military position while also being the C.E.O. of Blue Sea Logistics, a Kabul-based corporation that supplied anti-Taliban forces with everything from helicopter parts to armored tactical vehicles. During my visit to Helmand, Blackhawks under his command were committing massacres almost daily: twelve Afghans were killed while scavenging scrap metal at a former base outside Sangin; forty were killed in an almost identical incident at the Army’s abandoned Camp Walid; twenty people, most of them women and children, were killed by air strikes on the Gereshk bazaar; Afghan soldiers who were being held prisoner by the Taliban at a power station were targeted and killed by their own comrades in an air strike. (Sadat declined repeated requests for comment.)

The day before the massacre at the Yakh Chal outpost, CNN aired an interview with General Sadat. “Helmand is beautiful—if it’s peaceful, tourism can come,” he said. His soldiers had high morale, he explained, and were confident of defeating the Taliban. The anchor appeared relieved. “You seem very optimistic,” she said. “That’s reassuring to hear.”

I showed the interview to Mohammed Wali, a pushcart vender in a village near Lashkar Gah. A few days after the Yakh Chal massacre, government militias in his area surrendered to the Taliban. General Sadat’s Blackhawks began attacking houses, seemingly at random. They fired on Wali’s house, and his daughter was struck in the head by shrapnel and died. His brother rushed into the yard, holding the girl’s limp body up at the helicopters, shouting, “We’re civilians!” The choppers killed him and Wali’s son. His wife lost her leg, and another daughter is in a coma. As Wali watched the CNN clip, he sobbed. “Why are they doing this?” he asked. “Are they mocking us?”

In the course of a few hours in 2006, the Taliban killed thirty-two friends and relatives of Amir Dado, including his son. Three years later, they killed the warlord himself—who by then had joined parliament—in a roadside blast. The orchestrator of the assassination hailed from Pan Killay. In one light, the attack is the mark of a fundamentalist insurgency battling an internationally recognized government; in another, a campaign of revenge by impoverished villagers against their former tormentor; or a salvo in a long-simmering tribal war; or a hit by a drug cartel against a rival enterprise. All these readings are probably true, simultaneously. What’s clear is that the U.S. did not attempt to settle such divides and build durable, inclusive institutions; instead, it intervened in a civil war, supporting one side against the other. As a result, like the Soviets, the Americans effectively created two Afghanistans: one mired in endless conflict, the other prosperous and hopeful.

It is the hopeful Afghanistan that’s now under threat, after Taliban fighters marched into Kabul in mid-August—just as Hamdullah predicted. Thousands of Afghans have spent the past few weeks desperately trying to reach the Kabul airport, sensing that the Americans’ frenzied evacuation may be their last chance at a better life. “Bro, you’ve got to help me,” the helicopter pilot I’d spoken with earlier pleaded over the phone. At the time, he was fighting crowds to get within sight of the airport gate; when the wheels of the last U.S. aircraft pulled off the runway, he was left behind. His boss, Sami Sadat, reportedly escaped to the U.K.

Until recently, the Kabul that Sadat fled often felt like a different country, even a different century, from Sangin. The capital had become a city of hillside lights, shimmering wedding halls, and neon billboards that was joyously crowded with women: mothers browsed markets, girls walked in pairs from school, police officers patrolled in hijabs, office workers carried designer handbags. The gains these women experienced during the American War—and have now lost—are staggering, and hard to fathom when considered against the austere hamlets of Helmand: the Afghan parliament had a proportion of women similar to that of the U.S. Congress, and about a quarter of university students were female. Thousands of women in Kabul are understandably terrified that the Taliban have not evolved. In late August, I spoke by phone to a dermatologist who was bunkered in her home. She has studied in multiple countries, and runs a large clinic employing a dozen women. “I’ve worked too hard to get here,” she told me. “I studied too long, I made my own business, I created my own clinic. This was my life’s dream.” She had not stepped outdoors in two weeks.

The Taliban takeover has restored order to the conservative countryside while plunging the comparatively liberal streets of Kabul into fear and hopelessness. This reversal of fates brings to light the unspoken premise of the past two decades: if U.S. troops kept battling the Taliban in the countryside, then life in the cities could blossom. This may have been a sustainable project—the Taliban were unable to capture cities in the face of U.S. airpower. But was it just? Can the rights of one community depend, in perpetuity, on the deprivation of rights in another? In Sangin, whenever I brought up the question of gender, village women reacted with derision. “They are giving rights to Kabul women, and they are killing women here,” Pazaro said. “Is this justice?” Marzia, from Pan Killay, told me, “This is not ‘women’s rights’ when you are killing us, killing our brothers, killing our fathers.” Khalida, from a nearby village, said, “The Americans did not bring us any rights. They just came, fought, killed, and left.”

The women in Helmand disagree among themselves about what rights they should have. Some yearn for the old village rules to crumble—they wish to visit the market or to picnic by the canal without sparking innuendo or worse. Others cling to more traditional interpretations. “Women and men aren’t equal,” Shakira told me. “They are each made by God, and they each have their own role, their own strengths that the other doesn’t have.” More than once, as her husband lay in an opium stupor, she fantasized about leaving him. Yet Nilofar is coming of age, and a divorce could cast shame on the family, harming her prospects. Through friends, Shakira hears stories of dissolute cities filled with broken marriages and prostitution. “Too much freedom is dangerous, because people won’t know the limits,” she said.

All the women I met in Sangin, though, seemed to agree that their rights, whatever they might entail, cannot flow from the barrel of a gun—and that Afghan communities themselves must improve the conditions of women. Some villagers believe that they possess a powerful cultural resource to wage that struggle: Islam itself. “The Taliban are saying women cannot go outside, but there is actually no Islamic rule like this,” Pazaro told me. “As long as we are covered, we should be allowed.” I asked a leading Helmandi Taliban scholar where in Islam was it stipulated that women cannot go to the market or attend school. He admitted, somewhat chagrined, that this was not an actual Islamic injunction. “It’s the culture in the village, not Islam,” he said. “The people there have these beliefs about women, and we follow them.” Just as Islam offers fairer templates for marriage, divorce, and inheritance than many tribal and village norms, these women hope to marshal their faith—the shared language across their country’s many divides—to carve out greater freedoms.

Though Shakira hardly talks about it, she harbors such dreams herself. Through the decades of war, she continued to teach herself to read, and she is now working her way through a Pashto translation of the Quran, one sura at a time. “It gives me great comfort,” she said. She is teaching her youngest daughter the alphabet, and has a bold ambition: to gather her friends and demand that the men erect a girls’ school.

Even as Shakira contemplates moving Pan Killay forward, she is determined to remember its past. The village, she told me, has a cemetery that spreads across a few hilltops. There are no plaques, no flags, just piles of stones that glow red and pink in the evening sun. A pair of blank flagstones project from each grave, one marking the head, one the feet.

Shakira’s family visits every week, and she points to the mounds where her grandfather lies, where her cousins lie, because she doesn’t want her children to forget. They tie scarves on tree branches to attract blessings, and pray to those departed. They spend hours amid a sacred geography of stones, shrubs, and streams, and Shakira feels renewed.

Shortly before the Americans left, they dynamited her house, apparently in response to the Taliban’s firing a grenade nearby. With two rooms still standing, the house is half inhabitable, half destroyed, much like Afghanistan itself. She told me that she won’t mind the missing kitchen, or the gaping hole where the pantry once stood. Instead, she chooses to see a village in rebirth. Shakira is sure that a freshly paved road will soon run past the house, the macadam sizzling hot on summer days. The only birds in the sky will be the kind with feathers. Nilofar will be married, and her children will walk along the canal to school. The girls will have plastic dolls, with hair that they can brush. Shakira will own a machine that can wash clothes. Her husband will get clean, he will acknowledge his failings, he will tell his family that he loves them more than anything. They will visit Kabul, and stand in the shadow of giant glass buildings. “I have to believe,” she said. “Otherwise, what was it all for?” ♦

October 3, 2021

O método Bolsonaro: um assalto à democracia em camera lenta

 

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AFONSO BENITES, CARLA JIMÉNEZ, FELIPE BETIM, MARINA ROSSI, NAIARA GALARRAGA GORTÁZAR, REGIANE OLIVEIRA e JAMIL CHADE

Em 20 de janeiro de 2021, uma assessora do Departamento de Saúde e Serviços Humanos dos Estados Unidos durante o Governo de Donald Trump, Valerie Huber, escreveu um último e-mail aos seus aliados de outros países, no qual dedicou especial atenção ao Brasil. Huber ―uma forte defensora da abstinência, que trabalhava em larga escala contra programas de educação sexual e reprodutiva―  se despediu de seus colegas com o anúncio: "O Brasil, gentilmente, se ofereceu para servir agora como coordenador dessa coalião histporica", escreveu ela no e-mail ao qual EL PAIS teve acesso. A "coalizão histórica" era basicamente uma aliança internacional ultraconservadora criada para influenciar as decisões da Organização das Nações Unidas, da Organização Mundial da Saúde e de outros organismos multilaterais. Fracassada a tentativa de Trump de permanecer no poder, a ofensiva da direita global contra os direitos de uma nova geração foi deixada nas mãos do Governo Jair Bolsonaro.

Bolsonaro não ganhou como herança de Trump somente uma responsabilidade, mas também um manual não escrito de táticas de como erodir a democracia, que alguns líderes começaram a replicar sem sutilezas pelo mundo. Nenhum, talvez, com o atrevimento e determinação que fizeram do presidente brasileiro um porta-estandarte mundial da direita. Embora o ímpeto do golpe o acompanhe desde que chegou ao Palácio do Planalto, sua estratégia para enfraquecer as instituições e permanecer no poder torna-se cada vez mais evidente à medida que sua popularidade diminui e as eleições de 2022 parecem mais claras no horizonte.

“Ou fazemos eleições limpas, ou não teremos eleições”, disse Bolsonaro na última quinta-feira, 8 de julho, a seguidores que o esperam todos os dias na porta do Palácio da Alvorada, residência oficial do presidente, em Brasília. Atacar, sem apresentar evidências, a legitimidade das urnas eletrônicas ―o mesmo sistema eleitoral que o elegeu presidente e a outros cargos eletivos ao longo de sua carreira política― faz parte de sua campanha mais recente para não entregar o poder no ano que vem caso seja derrotado. No dia seguinte, Bolsonaro foi além. “Não tenho medo de eleições, entrego a faixa para quem ganhar no voto auditável e confiável. Dessa forma [como é hoje], corremos o risco de não termos eleições no ano que vem”, repetiu ele uma vez mais na sexta, 9.

O impulso golpista, entretanto, desta vez gerou uma reação em cadeia nos Três Poderes, que fizeram defesa pública do processo eleitoral brasileiro. “Não podemos admitir fala, ato, menção que seja atentatória à democracia”, disse o senador Rodrigo Pacheco, presidente do Congresso Nacional, descartando a possibilidade de haver qualquer interferência nas eleições. O presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal, Luiz Fux, o convidou dias depois para uma reunião, para “fixar balizas sólidas sobre a democracia brasileira” em nome da estabilidade política. O empenho por refrear os arroubos autoritários parecem insuficientes diante da velocidade com que o presidente impõe seu projeto de poder.

Bolsonaro não é o primeiro populista de extrema direita no mundo. Mas, sem dúvida, “é o adversário mais poderoso que a democracia brasileira já enfrentou em meio século”, como advertia em 2019 Yascha Mounk, professor da Universidade John Hopkins (EUA), no seu livro O povo contra a democracia, onde retratou como os líderes eleitos em países como Turquia, Hungria e Filipinas destroem o regime democrático por dentro. Em pouco mais de dois anos e meio como mandatário, já é possível decifrar o modus operandi do político forjado pelo Exército brasileiro que assumiu a Presidência em 1 de janeiro de 2019. Enquanto parte de sua atividade se concentra em perseguir seus críticos, inventar notícias falsas ou meias verdades que precisam ser desmentidas pelos jornais, e fomentar crises políticas com os outros Poderes, a máquina do Estado é utilizada para fortalecer os pilares que poderiam sustentá-lo no poder para além do voto. Se sua estratégia discursiva parece uma cópia da empregada por Donald Trump, sua metodologia mais poderosa é, paradoxalmente, a mesma que a adotada pelo chavismo: garantir a lealdade dos militares.

Democracia verde oliva

Os militares são hoje a espinha dorsal do Governo Bolsonaro. Há pelo menos 6.157 fardados espalhados entre diretorias, conselhos administrativos e gerências de empresas estatais, como Petrobras, Itaipu, Correios e Eletrobras. De seus 22 ministérios, nove são atualmente ocupados por militares da ativa ou da reserva. Eram dez até a queda do general Eduardo Pazuello do Ministério da Saúde, em março. “As Forças Armadas servem tanto como base política-eleitoral para o Governo Bolsonaro, mas também como instrumento de intimidação da oposição. Ele tenta passar a ideia de que pode usar a força contra seus inimigos políticos, por mais que não seja verdade”, diz o cientista político Octavio Amorim Neto, professor da Fundação Getulio Vargas. O mandatário já incorporou ao seu discurso até a expressão “Meu Exército” para demonstrar sua influência.

O presidente Jair Bolsonaro durante formatura na Academia Militar dos Agulhas Negras, em Resende (RJ) em 24 de setembro de 2020.
O presidente Jair Bolsonaro durante formatura na Academia Militar dos Agulhas Negras, em Resende (RJ) em 24 de setembro de 2020.Isac Nóbrega/PR

O Governo federal já gastou o equivalente a 86,8 bilhões de reais em privilégios à categoria, uma alta de 17% nos anos Bolsonaro. Neste cálculo, estão os benefícios concedidos pela reforma da Previdência da caserna ―podem se aposentar com salário integral, por exemplo—; um reajuste salarial de 13% —enquanto o dos demais servidores públicos não superou os 8%— e a concessão de comissionamentos extraordinários aos militares que participam de conselhos administrativos de estatais. A conta foi feita, a pedido do EL PAÍS, pelo cientista político Willian Nozaki, que em maio publicou o estudo A Militarização da Administração Pública no Brasil: projeto de nação ou projeto de poder?. Na equação não está inclusa a mudança na regra que permite que militares aposentados, como Bolsonaro ou seus ministros Walter Braga Netto (Defesa), Luiz Eduardo Ramos (Casa Civil) e Augusto Heleno (Gabinete da Segurança Institucional) possam receber acima do teto constitucional de 39.293 reais.

Bolsonaro estende benefícios aos policiais militares das 27 unidades da federação. Os PMs são uma base natural do presidente, que poderiam jogar a favor dele, a despeito do comando dos governadores, a quem respondem. O presidente aprovou recentemente um programa de financiamento habitacional exclusivo para as forças de segurança. Também incluiu na reforma Administrativa que tramita na Câmara dos Deputados um artigo que entende que os policiais seriam carreira típica de Estado, portanto, não correriam o risco de demissão, como as demais funções.

A pergunta é se todo esse prestígio alcançado pelos militares e PMs no Governo vai se converter em apoio em caso de uma tentativa de golpe do presidente no ano que vem. “Se isso acontecer, as Forças Armadas terão que tomar uma decisão. Se agirão dentro da legalidade, rompendo de vez publicamente com Bolsonaro ou não”, alerta Amorim Neto. As PMs, por sua vez, seguem a corrente que estiver mais forte. “As polícias no Brasil têm duplo comando. Elas obedecem aos 27 governadores e ao comandante do Exército. Se você perguntar para um oficial da PM quem ele irá seguir em caso de ameaça, a resposta que ele lhe dará será: quem estiver mais forte”, diz o professor Zaverucha.

O ex-ministro da Defesa e das Relações Exteriores sob Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff, Celso Amorim, acredita que nenhum comandante das Forças Armadas está de acordo com uma intervenção. “Isso é uma discussão mais entre alguns generais da reserva. Por mais que boa parte da tropa concorde com as ideias do presidente, ela vai contra o que pensa o Alto Comando do Exército. Ela não vai ultrapassar essa linha”, diz. Para Amorim, o presidente não é bem visto na caserna, quando forçosamente leva a política para dentro dos quartéis, como no episódio que resultou na demissão coletiva do ministro da Defesa e dos comandantes do Exército, Marinha e Aeronáutica, em maio, por discordarem da linha de atuação do presidente. O ex-ministro lembra também que todo golpe requer apoio internacional, algo que o Brasil deixou de ter após o início do Governo Joe Biden.

Os militares, contudo, também vivem o desgaste do poder ao lado de Bolsonaro. Eles emprestaram sua imagem a um Governo que perdeu prestígio com os resultados desastrosos da pandemia, alto desemprego e agora acossado com acusações de corrupção na compra de vacinas contra a covid-19 que alcançam integrantes do Exército. As acusações de propina, investigadas pela Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito da Pandemia, começam agora a levantar suspeitas sobre vários militares que ocupam ou ocuparam cargos no Ministério da Saúde.

Jair Bolsonaro não vive exatamente seu momento mais popular nem entre as instituições, nem junto à opinião pública. Rejeitado por metade da população pela gestão da crise sanitária, o mandatário tem encarado protestos puxados por partidos de esquerda contra sua administração desde maio. As pesquisas eleitorais já mostravam uma erosão do apoio popular pouco antes do noticiário brasileiro ser tomado pelas denúncias de corrupção no Ministério da Saúde na última semana de junho. Um levantamento feito pelo Instituto Ipec entre os dias 17 e 21 daquele mês revelava queda preocupante da sua popularidade diante do ex-presidente Lula: 49% a favor do petista, contra 23% do presidente, o que levaria Lula a ganhar em primeiro turno. Numa pesquisa mais recente, feita pelo instituto Datafolha entre os dias 7 e 8 deste mês, Lula aparece com 58% de apoio para sua candidatura presidencial contra 31% de Bolsonaro —a rejeição ao presidente chega a 59%, contra 37% do petista.

Combustível para se reerguer03:30

Faltando um ano e três meses para as eleições presidenciais, Bolsonaro ainda tem tempo, eleitores e alianças fiéis, além da máquina pública a seu favor para navegar nestas águas revoltas até chegar a 2022 competitivo para se reeleger. Ao farejar o risco de perder as eleições, o presidente já plantou as sementes do caos ―assim como Trump fez no ano passado― inventando um risco de fraude. A verborragia calculada para atormentar adversários e incomodar as instituições ajuda a desviar a atenção. É o método adotado desde que assumiu a presidência.

E ―novamente seguindo o roteiro trumpista―, dia sim, dia não, submete o país a sobressaltos com seus discursos radicais e falas distópicas que confrontam a realidade e desafiam a Constituição. Enquanto distrai a opinião pública, muda leis por atos institucionais que não dependem do Congresso. No dia 19 de julho de 2019, por exemplo, durante um café da manhã com jornalistas estrangeiros, Bolsonaro afirmou que não existia gente passando fome no Brasil, apesar de 5,2 milhões de brasileiros que se encontravam nessa situação àquela altura, mais do que a população da Nova Zelândia. “Falar que se passa fome no Brasil é uma grande mentira”, dizia enfaticamente na presença de jornalistas internacionais. “Passa-se mal, não come bem. Agora passar fome, não”, afirmou ele com veemência.

Enquanto a imprensa repercutia a sua fala, naquele mesmo dia foi publicado no Diário Oficial da União o decreto número 9.926/19 que promoveu um revogaço de 324 atos administrativos, incluindo o que determinava a criação de conselhos com a participação de representantes da sociedade civil em decisões sobre políticas públicas. Essa foi a primeira canetada para reduzir o controle social sobre o poder público. Outros vieram, diminuindo também a transparência dos atos públicos.

No início da pandemia, no ano passado, o Governo editou uma medida provisória suspendendo os prazos de respostas aos pedidos de informação enquanto durasse a crise sanitária para todos os órgãos cujos servidores estivessem em regime de teletrabalho. A MP ficou em vigor de março a julho de 2020 e tirou o acesso aos dados públicos num momento em que o país se organizava para enfrentar o novo coronavírus. Em junho deste ano, o Comando do Exército decretou sigilo de 100 anos no processo administrativo contra o general Pazuello, ex-ministro da Saúde, por ter participado de ato político com apoiadores de Bolsonaro, o que é proibido pelo regulamento das Forças Armadas aos militares da ativa, como é o caso dele. O processo foi aberto, mas o Exército entendeu que o ex ministro não cometeu “transgressão disciplinar” e arquivou o caso.

A promulgação de atos ―portaria, resolução, decretos, instrução normativa, edital, lei, despachos— é outra das frentes de erosão democrática usada como método por Bolsonaro. Em dois anos e meio no poder, 1.060 decretos já foram assinados pelo presidente. Como comparação, Dilma Rousseff assinou 614 dessa natureza, grande parte para regulamentar leis ou organizar a gestão pública. Porém, na gestão Bolsonaro, eles se tornaram uma importante ferramenta para contrariar a Constituição e as engrenagens que sustentam a democracia do país. Muitos são revertidos no Supremo Tribunal Federal. Mas enquanto não são julgados, garantem que o plano de poder do presidente avance algumas casas.

Foi assim que Bolsonaro conseguiu ampliar a venda de armas no Brasil, apesar de o país ter um Estatuto do Desarmamento, previsto em lei federal aprovado pela Congresso em 2003. O Estatuto previa um referendo em 2005. Mais de 63% dos brasileiros votaram contra a proibição da venda de armas naquele ano. As restrições à posse de armas, porém, continuaram valendo segundo a lei de 2003. Mas desde que Bolsonaro assumiu a presidência, já foram mais de 30 atos normativos para alterar a política de acesso às armas no país.

Os quatro decretos mais recentes foram assinados em fevereiro deste ano com o objetivo de facilitar ainda mais a venda de armas e reduzir a fiscalização pelos órgãos competentes. “Temos projetos antigos no Congresso do grupo pró-armas, mas eles sempre enfrentaram resistência. Nenhuma ação conseguiu desmontar o Estatuto do Desarmamento, por isso o Governo partiu para os decretos”, afirma Melina Risso, diretora de programas do Instituto Igarapé. Risso explica que, apesar dos decretos poderem ser contestados mais facilmente na Justiça —a ministra do Supremo Rosa Weber suspendeu em liminar a eficácia de diversos dispositivos de quatro decretos presidenciais—, as armas que já foram vendidas durante a queda de braço jurídica não terão mais retorno. “A obsessão do presidente pelas armas foi o primeiro sinal de que o Governo iria mexer com o sistema democrático, uma vez que ele começa a fazer decretos para legislar. E uma vez derrubado o decreto, o Governo revoga e publica outros três. É uma forma de driblar os sistemas de controle”, afirma.

Em um cenário hipotético em que Bolsonaro perde a reeleição e tenta se manter no poder, a existência de um grande grupo de simpatizantes que se muniram de armas de fogo durante seu Governo representa um cenário sinistro. Desse modo, contornar os limites impostos pelas leis cumpre uma dupla função: manter a lealdade de seu núcleo duro de apoio e, ao mesmo tempo, proteger seus próprios interesses.

Enquanto os atos facilitam a venda de armas, nenhuma outra área sofreu mais ataques do Governo Bolsonaro sob esse método do que a proteção socioambiental. Já são 1.112 atos voltados para alterar a legislação ambiental e facilitar a exploração das florestas, segundo o monitor Política por Inteiro, do Instituto Talanoa. A eficiência dessa estratégia é incontestável. O desmatamento na Amazônia bate recorde desde a chegada de Bolsonaro e o Governo faz vista grossa para a ação de garimpeiros e madeireiros. O Fundo Amazônia, que recebe doações estrangeiras com o objetivo de promover ações de controle e combate ao desmatamento na Amazônia, foi uma das vítimas desse revogaço. O fundo tinha um comitê técnico que, deliberadamente, não foi retomado. Assim, foi rompido o contrato, deixando 2,9 bilhões de reais acumulados no fundo até hoje.

Do total de atos, 107 tiveram como objetivo flexibilizar as normas vigentes de forma unilateral pelo Executivo. Foi assim que Bolsonaro cumpriu uma de suas promessas de campanha: acabar com o que chamou de “indústria da multa no campo”. Um decreto de abril de 2019 passou a obrigar os órgãos de fiscalização a “estimular a conciliação” nos casos de infrações administrativas por danos ao meio ambiente. Na prática, os infratores passaram a ser convidados a participar das audiências, que não são obrigatórias. E mesmo os que são multados pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Meio Ambiente (Ibama) ganham descontos e maiores prazos para pagar. “A conciliação ambiental foi criada para travar as multas. Essas audiências não foram marcadas. Criou-se a indústria do perdão”, lamenta Natalie Unterstell, diretora-presidente do Instituto Talanoa.

Não por acaso os ruralistas interessados em ampliar seus domínios no campo em antítese à preservação são hoje uma base de sustentação do presidente. A bancada de deputados que representam o agronegócio é parte do grupo legislativo Centrão que garante ao presidente a sua estabilidade no poder, depois do acordo selado no ano passado. Essa convergência no Congresso levou à aprovação, em 13 de maio, de um projeto de lei que flexibiliza regras para concessão de licenciamento ambiental para determinados empreendimentos. E ao apoio à aprovação do projeto de lei 490, que dificulta demarcações de terras indígenas e abre espaço para que as terras sejam exploradas pelo agronegócio —foi aprovado no final de junho numa comissão da Câmara.

A intimidação pública de indígenas e ativistas também é parte do plano Bolsonaro. Em abril deste ano a Polícia Federal abriu inquérito para apurar a conduta dos líderes indígenas Sônia Guajajara e Almir Suruí por supostamente propagar “mentiras” contra o Planalto. O suposto crime foi veicular vídeos de uma campanha de preservação da memória dos povos indígenas, cujo fio condutor era o mote “Nenhuma gota a mais”, referente ao sangue derramado por ataques de invasores ou pela covid-19. O pedido de inquérito partiu da Fundação Nacional do Índio (Funai), hoje dirigida por um ex-dirigente da PF, Marcelo Xavier, a pedido do presidente. Sem provas, o inquérito foi arquivado dois meses depois.

Em setembro de 2019, uma operação da Polícia Civil de Santarém, em Belém do Pará, mandou prender quatro brigadistas voluntários sob suspeita de terem promovido um incêndio criminoso em setembro em Alter do Chão, uma região paradisíaca no norte do país. Os quatro jovens tiveram as cabeças raspadas e foram acusados de provocar os incêndios para obter mais verbas de ONGs num inquérito cheio de falhas. Era tudo especulação, como apontou um inquérito da Polícia Federal concluído em 2020, que afirmou não haver evidências de que os quatro rapazes eram culpados. Foi um grande espetáculo que serviu para Bolsonaro se descolar da responsabilidade pelo chamado Dia do Fogo, organizado por fazendeiros bolsonaristas do Pará, com queimadas tão intensas que fizeram a fumaça chegar até São Paulo, a milhares de quilômetros de lá. As ações, no entanto, seguem a reverberar na rede de informações dos bolsonaristas até hoje com versões que culpam os brigadistas, as ONGs, e afirmam até que o ator Leonardo di Caprio financiaria essas organizações com intuito criminoso.

Notícias sob medida

As redes de comunicação do bolsonarismo são um capítulo à parte na fragilização da democracia brasileira. Desde que assumiu o poder, Bolsonaro faz uma live semanal nas redes sociais em que muitas vezes desdiz ―num espaço blindado para críticas― o que ele ou seus ministros afirmaram em público. No exercício de poder, o presidente mantém sua linha de intolerância com os jornalistas, em arroubos que já eram conhecidos desde seus tempos de deputado. E se multiplicaram com Bolsonaro presidente, incluindo milícias virtuais para atacar profissionais, especialmente mulheres, num assédio amplificado por seus seguidores. Não por acaso, o mandatário brasileiro entrou este ano para a seleta lista de protofascistas que perseguem a imprensa, segundo a ONG Repórteres sem Fronteiras. Nessa lista de “predadores da imprensa” estão Nicolás Maduro, e o ditador da Coreia do Norte, Kim Jong-un.

Sua aversão à imprensa fez o presidente fechar um círculo com sites e redes de televisão que o apoiam incondicionalmente —e recebem melhores verbas publicitárias estatais por isso. São portais e TVs que reduzem o impacto da pandemia da covid-19, e ignoram as suas manobras casuísticas. Bolsonaro só dá entrevistas a esses meios afins. Parte da estratégia bolsonarista incluiu facilitar a venda de uma concessão pública de televisão à Rede Jovem Pan, o grupo com o maior número de comentaristas defensores de Bolsonaro na rádio e na internet.

É dessas fontes que seus mais leais seguidores se abastecem de informações. Vinicius Publio, de 45 anos, por exemplo, é um orgulhoso bolsonarista que não acompanha a imprensa e raramente assiste a um telejornal. Ele busca informações pelas redes que apoiam Bolsonaro e as que o presidente, sua equipe e seus ciberescudeiros alimentam com uma avalanche de conteúdos. Entre eles, vídeos com propaganda das ações do Governo, as visitas surpresas de Bolsonaro a pequenas cidades, balanços ministeriais triunfalistas, muitas vezes com meias verdades.

Publio admira o perfil do presidente. “É autêntico, fala claramente, diz o que o povo quer ouvir”, explica ele numa cafeteria em Barueri, na grande São Paulo. Publio compartilha com o presidente os valores, a ideologia, o gosto por armas e pelas motos potentes. A bordo de sua BMW, foi um dos que acompanharam o mandatário no comboio de motos num sábado de junho pelas ruas e estradas de São Paulo. Bolsonaro transformou os passeios de motos com seguidores em manifestações públicas de apoio popular, dentro de uma sofisticada estratégia de relacionamento com seus seguidores.

O bolsonarista Vinicius Publio, 45, posa com sua motocicleta em Barueri, cidade de São Paulo onde trabalha como policial militar, no dia 23 de junho.
O bolsonarista Vinicius Publio, 45, posa com sua motocicleta em Barueri, cidade de São Paulo onde trabalha como policial militar, no dia 23 de junho.Toni Pires

Casado e pai de dois filhos adolescentes, Publio combina seu emprego na Polícia Militar com negócios imobiliários. Personifica o núcleo duro dos eleitores de Bolsonaro, aqueles que permanecem leais a ele apesar de tudo. Mais de meio milhão de mortes por pandemia, inflação ascendente, incêndios na Amazônia ... “São cerca de 15% do eleitorado brasileiro, com presença destacada de homens brancos de certa idade e alta renda”, explica Isabela Kalil, coordenadora do Observatório de Extrema Direita.

É este grupo que endossa o presidente e propaga suas verdades sem questionar. Uma parte do Brasil que é imagem e semelhança com o presidente. Bolsonaro governa no caos para ganhar espaço político e implementar seu projeto de poder. Enquanto não alcança um novo mandato, usa os recursos disponíveis na legislação brasileira para intimidar adversários. Desde que assumiu, em 2019, seu Governo intensificou a perseguição a seus críticos com base na Lei de Segurança Nacional (LSN).

Consolidada em 1983, dois anos antes do fim da ditadura, a LSN é mais um entulho da era militar no Brasil. É ela que tem embasado inquéritos abertos pela Polícia Federal e até pela Polícia Civil contra professores, artistas, ativistas. Foram vítimas de processos do Governo com base nessa lei desde o youtuber Felipe Neto por chamar Bolsonaro de “genocida” nas redes sociais, o cartunista Aroeira, que desenhou o símbolo do fascismo como se o presidente o tivesse pintado, até o jornalista Ricardo Noblat por ter partilhado a charge de Aroeira nas redes sociais. “Essa lei significou um dos elementos que mantinham o sistema ditatorial. Ela pune a crítica”, diz Pedro Estevam Serrano, professor de Direito da PUC-SP. “Deveria ter sido revogada e não foi, mas em compensação existia um certo pacto na sociedade por não utilizá-la.”

O autoritarismo do presidente no emprego dessa lei contamina até “o guarda da esquina”, usando a expressão cunhada na ditadura pelo então vice-presidente Pedro Aleixo no Governo de Costa e Silva, em 1968, que temia o efeito da institucionalização do AI-5 sobre as tropas. No final de maio, o professor Arquidones Leão, de Trindade, região metropolitana de Goiânia, foi detido por um policial militar por supostamente caluniar o presidente. Leão tinha uma faixa colada ao capô do carro onde se lia “Fora Bolsonaro Genocida”. A justificativa do policial para detê-lo era o desrespeito à Lei de Segurança Nacional. Leão, que é também secretário estadual do Partido dos Trabalhadores em Goiás, teve de depor na Polícia Federal, e foi liberado horas depois.

As salas de aulas e as universidades têm sido uma frente de batalha para Bolsonaro desde que chegou ao poder. Segundo ele, estão cheias de esquerdistas pregando o comunismo. O Governo tentou interferir até nas eleições de reitores eleitos por seus pares com a edição de uma medida provisória que dava poderes ao ministro da Educação de eleger os nomes durante a pandemia. Passou a intimidar também professores que fizessem críticas ao Governo com processos na Justiça. Em janeiro deste ano os professores universitários Erika Suruagy e Tiago Costa Rodrigues foram alvos de inquérito da Polícia Federal por publicarem críticas ao presidente em outdoors de suas cidades. Suruagy vive em Recife, e Rodrigues, em Palmas, no Tocantins. Os inquéritos foram arquivados meses depois por falta de consistência nas acusações. Mas o estrago foi feito. “As portas se fecharam, não consegui mais trabalho”, conta Rodrigues, que teve de se mudar de cidade. “O clima é de medo”, resume a professora Erika Suruagy.

Tiago Costa Rodrigues foi indiciado pela PF depois de ter espalhado outdoors em Palmas (TO) com mensagens contra o presidente Jair Bolsonaro. O inquérito foi arquivado agora em junho.
Tiago Costa Rodrigues foi indiciado pela PF depois de ter espalhado outdoors em Palmas (TO) com mensagens contra o presidente Jair Bolsonaro. O inquérito foi arquivado agora em junho.Fernando Leite

Também um grupo de professores e alunos da Universidade Federal do Ceará é alvo de inquérito da Polícia Federal por aulas sobre os riscos do fascismo. Alunos eleitores de Bolsonaro delataram os docentes do curso à polícia por um suposto assédio contra eles.

Dentro da sala de aula, há uma pressão para evitar assuntos ligados à política. Não foram poucos os casos de vídeos de professores filmados por alunos fazendo alguma crítica informal, mas que circularam nas redes bolsonaristas como uma conspiração comunista. “Se a universidade não pode falar, não pode discutir ideias, quem fará isso? Não existe democracia que se sustente sem as universidades”, diz Suruagy.

O presidente também mina os investimentos nas universidades, estrangulando ainda mais o já sufocado orçamento do ensino superior. De 2019 para cá, o corte da verba das universidades federais chega a 25%, segundo a Associação Nacional dos Dirigentes das Instituições Federais de Ensino Superior (Andifes). O assédio não se restringe aos professores universitários. A Articulação Nacional das Carreiras Públicas para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável (Arca), coalizão de entidades do setor público, por exemplo, identificou mais de 820 episódios de assédio. Segundo o levantamento, o Ibama encabeça a lista dos órgãos onde mais ocorreram essas intimidações.

Resistência

O Judiciário, em especial a Corte Suprema, tem sido uma barreira para inibir os abusos de poder do presidente. A Corte tem desarmado parte das bombas-relógios que o Governo cria com a promulgação de medidas provisórias, por exemplo. A Corte também liderou a investigação, conduzida pela Polícia Federal, sobre as redes digitais bolsonaristas que incentivaram a perseguição e assédio ao próprio Judiciário e a opositores do presidente. O chamado inquérito dos atos antidemocráticos encontrou indícios de “uma verdadeira organização criminosa” que ataca a democracia, e que conta com o trabalho de parlamentares, empresários que apoiam o presidente e blogueiros que espalham notícias falsas. O ministro Alexandre de Moraes, relator do inquérito, abriu uma nova frente de investigação a partir de agora.

Hoje há mais de 100 pedidos de impeachment de Bolsonaro na mesa do presidente da Câmara, Arthur Lira (PP-AL), que já demonstrou não ter interesse em avançar com o assunto. O último, apresentado no final de junho como um superpedido reunindo todos os demais que já estão com Lira, trazia uma lista de 23 potenciais crimes de responsabilidade, incluindo o de prevaricação (um crime contra a administração pública, que ocorre quando um agente público deixa de cumprir seu dever por interesse pessoal), uma vez que Jair Bolsonaro foi informado pelo deputado Luis Miranda (DEM-DF) e seu irmão, o servidor da Saúde Luis Ricardo Miranda, sobre a pressão por propina na compra de uma vacina contra a covid-19. Embora tenha assegurado aos irmãos Miranda que iria investigar, o presidente não deu nenhuma ordem nesse sentido.

As ruas começaram a ganhar expressão em maio, especialmente com o papel que a CPI da Pandemia passou a exercer apontando as responsabilidades do presidente sobre o caos na saúde. Protestos organizados pela esquerda levaram milhares de brasileiros às manifestações, especialmente nas capitais do país, em três ocasiões, mas ainda sem a adesão de partidos de centro ou da direita. É nesta encruzilhada que o Brasil se encontra, com os maiores partidos resistindo a se unir aos protestos, hoje dominados por eleitores do ex-presidente Lula.

Em seu livro O povo contra a democracia, o professor Yascha Mounk lembra que na maioria dos países os populistas só alcançam o cargo máximo porque seus adversários fracassam em concluir um pacto eleitoral. “Embora seja natural presumir que a ameaça autoritária possa nos ajudar a enxergar as coisas com mais lucidez, o oposto também é verdadeiro: aflitos e apavorados, os adversários dos populistas começam a fazer o jogo político da pureza, impondo testes… recusando-se a abraçar antigos aliados do populista”, diz ele.

Um passo importante foi dado pelo ex-presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) que desde abril sinaliza que pode votar em Lula num eventual segundo turno com Bolsonaro. “Quem não tem cão caça com gato”, afirmou Cardoso. Nomes cotados para disputar as eleições de 2022 ouvidos pelo EL PAÍS nos últimos meses tinham claro que a união contra Bolsonaro é irreversível e não descartam abrir mão de candidatura em algum momento da corrida eleitoral para evitar que ele avance ao segundo turno.

O objetivo é evitar a reeleição de Bolsonaro, onde ele dobraria a aposta nas quebras democráticas, como aconteceu em outros países governados por líderes radicais. “Todos os Governos autoritários atuais, seja na Venezuela ou na Hungria, foram degradando aos poucos a democracia no primeiro mandato e o desmonte final veio no segundo”, lembra Pedro Abramovay, diretor da Open Society.

“Bolsonaro não tem convicção democrática, ele aceita [a democracia] por questão estratégica”, diz o cientista político Jorge Zaverucha, professor da Universidade Federal do Pernambuco. “Ele fica esperando para, se um dia os ventos soprarem para uma solução autoritária, ele embarcar nela”, acrescenta. À espera de tempestades, Bolsonaro avança em seus propósitos. Muitos brasileiros os percebem. E os temem.

Ilustração: Agustín Sciammarella.

EL PAIS

September 25, 2021

Morre Ota, cartunista e lendário editor da revista 'Mad', aos 67 anos

 Otacílio Costa d’Assunção Barros, o Ota Foto: Arquivo pessoal de André d'Assunção

Conbinando traço econômico e texto mordaz, Otacílio Costa d’Assunção Barros se tornou referência do humor gráfico brasileiro, celebrado por colegas; artista foi encontrado morto em seu apartamento no Rio

September 19, 2021

How America Failed in Afghanistan

 “To blame Afghans for not getting their act together in light of

By
Isaac Chotiner
The New Yorker
 
On Sunday, as the Taliban entered Kabul—the last remaining major Afghan city not under the group’s control—the President of the country, Ashraf Ghani, fled to Tajikistan, making clear that the U.S.-backed Afghan government had collapsed. Five months ago, in April, President Joe Biden announced that all U.S. and NATO troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Critics have accused the Administration of conducting a rushed, poorly planned, and chaotic withdrawal since then. On Thursday, the U.S. government announced that it would be sending in marines and soldiers to help evacuate embassy personnel. But the speed of the Taliban advance has stunned American officials and left desperate Afghans trying to flee the country. Responding to criticism about his plan, Biden has sought to shift blame to the Afghan government and its people, saying, “They have got to fight for themselves.”

I spoke by phone with my colleague, the New Yorker staff writer Steve Coll, about the situation in Afghanistan. The dean of Columbia Journalism School, Coll is the author of “Ghost Wars” and “Directorate S,” which together chronicle much of the history of the past several decades in Afghanistan and Pakistan. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why it has been so hard for the United States to train the Afghan army, the different humanitarian crises facing the country, and the Biden Administration’s “outrageous” callousness toward a situation America played a role in creating.

What about the events of the past few weeks has surprised you, and what was the predictable result of Biden’s policy announcement in April?

I think the speed of the political collapse in Afghanistan surprised a lot of people. The pathway of the collapse was predicted and predictable. This has happened in Afghan political and military history a couple of times before. But there was a speed and momentum of people recalculating where their interests lay, and switching sides, and capitulating without violence that I don’t think the Biden Administration had expected when it announced its timetable in the spring.

You could argue that this shows the Biden Administration’s policy was a mistake, but you could also argue that, if this was going to happen so quickly after two decades of American troops in Afghanistan, there was no way to make this work without pledging to stay forever. How do you think about those two ways of looking at the situation, or do you think that dichotomy isn’t helpful?

I think that dichotomy describes two poles that represent the range of choices that the Biden Administration faced, and in between those poles had been, more or less, the policy going back to the second term of the Barack Obama Administration—which was a smaller, sustained deployment. There were twenty-five hundred troops there when the Biden Administration came to office. The rate of casualties incurred by NATO forces was almost at the level of traffic accidents for much of the past couple of years. So a sustained, smaller deployment—not free, but nothing like the expenditures of the past—linked to a search for some more sustainable political outcome had been visible. The Trump Administration followed that path, too, picking it up from the Obama Administration, and the Trump White House had become quite ambitious about it. It had negotiated with the Taliban an agreement that had a timetable, including regarding American withdrawal. But, until the Trump Administration got to that point, it had been following the same pathway as its predecessor.

I think in between was this question of whether the benefits of a messy degree of stability justified having the small-to-medium deployment that America has in other parts of the world. That is what you are going to hear in Washington. The counter-argument to the Biden Administration’s policy is not going to be forever war and the defeat of the Taliban; it is going to be a critique of the haste with which it pulled the plug on what was not a large deployment, and one that was not incurring a lot of casualties.

Why, ultimately, was it so hard to stand up the Afghan military to a greater extent than America did? Was it some lack of political legitimacy? Some problem with the actual training?

I don’t know what proportion of the factors, including the ones you listed, to credit. But I think that the one additional reason it didn’t work was the sheer scale of the ambition. And this was visible in Iraq as well. Building a standing army of three hundred thousand in a country that has been shattered by more than forty consecutive years of war and whose economy is almost entirely dependent on external aid—that just doesn’t work. What did work was what at various stages people thought might be possible, which was to build a stronger, more coherent, better-trained force, which has effectively been the only real fighting force on behalf of the Kabul government over the past few years. This force is referred to as commandos or Special Forces, but it is basically twenty or thirty thousand people. That you can build with a lot of investment and hands-on training. But you can’t just create an army of three hundred thousand. I remember talking to the Pakistani generals about this circa 2012. And they all said, “You just can’t do that. It won’t work.” They turned out to be right.

The writer Anand Gopal, who has reported extensively from Afghanistan, wrote, “The US designed the Afghan state to meet Washington’s counterterrorism interests, not the interests of Afghans, and what we see today is the result.” Do you agree?

I assume what that means is that the state-building project, such as it was—and about which there were varying degrees of commitment, including very little at the very beginning, after the fall of the last Taliban government—was undermined by the dependence on independent militias and commanders whose role in security was seen as necessary, especially early on, because the main U.S.-led NATO agenda in Afghanistan and the region was counterterrorism. The men under arms—the power brokers or warlords—were seen as essential to that agenda, and it was very difficult to build a normal state when the militias were beyond political accountability (never mind the rule of law) and dominating so many regions of the country.

Over time, there was a recognition that this was not sustainable, and there were efforts to try to fold them into a more normal-looking state and constitutional military, but that project was never accompanied by a push for accountability or an end to the effective independence and corruption associated with those regional militias. I assume you can say that is all the fault of the Western design, but I am not sure I buy that. Afghanistan had these fighting forces on its soil on 9/11 because of the continuous war that had been triggered by the Soviet invasion in 1979, and they didn’t require a U.S.-dictated constitutional design to persist. Of course, they persisted. The real complication about the design of the Afghan state that is now collapsing has at least as much to do with Afghans coming into the country from exile—the same dynamic that we saw in Iraq. Often, very talented and committed people who had been forced out of the country by the wars going back to the late nineteen-seventies tried to bargain with the leaders in Afghanistan about what kind of constitutional and power-sharing system should be designed. They were trying to create a system that would accommodate the power of the militias who had never left, in a very centralized constitutional design.

President Biden’s attitude toward Afghanistan of late has seemed to be one of annoyance, while he’s also putting a strong emphasis on the need for Afghans to stand up and fight for their country. How do you feel about an American President putting that forward after the U.S. has been intimately involved in that country for decades?

I try to tamp down my emotions about it, because I think it is an outrageous critique. I can understand the frustration that American decision-makers have had with their partners in the Kabul government for the past twenty years. It has been a very rocky road, and it isn’t all the fault of U.S. Presidents and Vice-Presidents and national-security advisers. But to suggest that the Afghan people haven’t done their bit is a kind of blame-shifting that I think is not only unjustifiable but outrageous. The Afghans now have suffered generation after generation of not just continuous warfare but humanitarian crises, one after the other, and Americans have to remember that this wasn’t a civil war that the Afghans started among themselves that the rest of the world got sucked into. This situation was triggered by an outside invasion, initially by the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, and since then the country has been a battleground for regional and global powers seeking their own security by trying to militarily intervene in Afghanistan, whether it be the United States after 2001, the C.I.A. in the nineteen-eighties, Pakistan through its support first for the mujahideen and later the Taliban, or Iran and its clients. To blame Afghans for not getting their act together in light of that history is just wrong.

Next door to Afghanistan, in what is now Pakistan, the British stayed a very long time and then left so abruptly, in 1947, that it resulted in incredible bloodletting. Do you see a callback to that imperial age, in the sense that the outside power wants to wash its hands of the situation and says that it is done without much care for how it leaves?

I agree with that. There is a lot to learn, and, in fairness to the Biden Administration, it inherited from the Trump Administration a terrible situation, because of the concessions the Trump Administration had made to the Taliban about the timing of a U.S. withdrawal. I said earlier that the U.S. deployment that Biden pulled was small, and the violence faced by them was de minimis, but that was true largely because of the terms of the flawed deal that the Trump Administration had negotiated with the Taliban, in which one of the commitments by the Taliban was not to attack U.S. troops in exchange for a hard deadline of May of this year for the last troops to leave. So, when the Biden Administration, in the pressure-filled first weeks of its term, reviewed the situation, it understandably feared that, if it tried to repudiate or rewrite the agreement that the Trump Administration had reached, it might transform a relatively quiet and stable experience for the U.S. military into another bloody round of combat that would undermine the Administration’s plans and foreign-policy priorities. So it pulled the plug and got exactly that result, which is now all that anyone is talking about.

But, to go back to your original observation, I do think that the haste and indifference, the blaming of the Afghans, the linkage of the decision to narrow U.S. interests and the anniversary of 9/11, all of that did have an air of—maybe “contempt” is not too strong a word for it—about what the consequences of this would be in Afghanistan. The decisions of the Obama Administration, and the Trump Administration in the first couple of years, reflected a rare political consensus in the United States that there was a willingness to sustain a relatively small troop deployment and expenditures in Afghanistan for a path out that would not lead to what we are watching now. And the President himself seems to have personally decided that that was a fool’s errand, and that he would not persist with what he perceived to be the illusions around that kind of search. But there was no crisis in expenditure or war from the American perspective that would have required such a quick decision.

O.K., but doesn’t the speed at which this is now happening suggest that the Taliban would never have negotiated something in good faith for a long-term solution.

It certainly suggests that the Taliban were not serious about ever sharing power in the way that the United States and its European allies and many sections of the Afghan government and society had hoped they might. But the problem was not a naïve faith that the Taliban had lessened their unwillingness to share power, because they hadn’t. They had been terribly stubborn throughout the negotiations. They declined even to talk to the Afghan government on very ideological grounds of historical legitimacy. So there was no reason to say that the Taliban had passed the test of credible international diplomacy, but they were talking. And the hope was that, over time, they could be drawn gradually to demonstrations of reduced violence in which the conversation about political futures would not be dominated by the violence and revolutionary ambitions of the Taliban’s history. Look at the negotiations with the FARC in Colombia. How long did those last? Twenty years? Even now, you have a messy result, but these are not negotiations that typically result quickly in an agreement. You would expect it to be a very slow process.

What was flawed about the Trump Administration’s agreement was not a misunderstanding of the Taliban necessarily, but the timeline it set. The Administration basically used the negotiations as cover to leave before it had achieved any of the things that it said the negotiations were designed to do.

But is there any tension between saying, essentially, on the one hand that the deployment was not costing that many Americans lives and on the other that we got the Taliban to stop killing so many Americans only because we promised to leave? Could we have kept that balance if we weren’t promising to leave?

The American casualty rate was low even before the Taliban agreed to stop attacking Americans. This is not to say that each loss wasn’t painfully felt and meaningful, but coverage on the rate of casualty had disappeared from the news cycle starting around 2015 or 2016, when the deployment was down to the ten-thousand range. The problem with sustainability outside the negotiations was the way in which the war was being prosecuted after NATO troops were drawn way down; essentially, it was an air war connected to the Special Forces on the ground. A harder question about this middle-way policy is how long you are going to bomb the Taliban into submission. The reason there was a military stalemate from roughly 2006 to this summer was that the American-led coalition, including the Afghan forces on the ground, had a monopoly on air power, and the Taliban had no answer for air power. But, of course, bombing in a country like Afghanistan is never precise, and there are civilian casualties and a sense of siege in some of the areas where air power was brought to bear. How long was that going to be the answer?

Your books on the region suggest that the Taliban may not have initially come to power, nor survived this long, had it not been for the aid and comfort of the Pakistani security apparatus—its military and intelligence services. How is Pakistan feeling about what’s happening now? I sense maybe there’s a tiny bit more anxiety than usual about what this might mean for Pakistan.

It seems likely that it is partially a case of watching what you wish for. I am sure they did not forecast the speed with which events are unfolding this summer, and they may also have expected that the role of negotiations and the timetable by which political change would occur in Afghanistan would allow them to build a platform for greater international legitimacy and credibility for a potential Taliban government. One of the reasons that I would be anxious if I were them is that this is happening in a way that is already inducing governments such as Germany’s—not usually first out of the box on these things—to say that they won’t provide any aid to a government that imposes Sharia against the will of its people.

Zalmay Khalilzad, Biden’s negotiator, is trying to tell the Taliban that they won’t be recognized by anyone if they take power this way. Well, we’ll see. In the nineteen-nineties, there were only three governments in the world that recognized the Taliban: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. And this time around, too, Pakistan will be one of them, I expect. But things are different. The Saudis and the Emiratis have a new geopolitical outlook. But China is not the same country that it was in the nineties. How will China support Pakistan in trying to manage a second Taliban regime, especially one that may attract sanctions or other kinds of pressure from the United States and its allies? It isn’t the nineties, but Pakistan is still in the same awkward place that it was last time around. And to the extent that the Taliban return to a kind of internationalism of their interpretation of Islam and welcome Al Qaeda types or other forms of radicals, allow the Islamic State to incubate on Afghan soil, or don’t have the interest or the capacity to do something about it, you can be sure that, as it did the last time, all of that will blow back on Pakistan in one way or another, be that in the form of international pressure or instability.

How do you see the next month playing out?

It is important for the international community to recognize that Afghanistan is entering another devastating humanitarian crisis of the kind it has seen too many times before, between refugee flows, insecurity in the areas that the Taliban have seized, uncertainty about how the Taliban will handle their enemies—will there be mass executions or internments? Then, you add to that the COVID crisis and the humanitarian challenges in rural Afghanistan that were already in place before this summer, and you are looking at a really dark season for the Afghan population. I don’t expect the Biden Administration to change its policy, and even if it did I don’t expect that it could reverse the Taliban’s momentum without bombing Afghanistan to smithereens. But it can certainly take responsibility for the lion’s share of the response to this unfolding humanitarian crisis, which after all does involve a little bit of self-interest, because, if Afghanistan generates another massive refugee flow toward Europe, that will have political consequences that will wash right through the West.


September 18, 2021

Traidor socorre traidor

 

 


ALDO FORNAZIERI 

Ao socorrer Bolsonaro quando
este enfrentava um forte fogo
nutrido vindo do STF, Michel
Temer foi saudado como um gran-
de constitucionalista, um pacificador,
por setores políticos, analistas e jorna-
listas da grande mídia. A saudação não
causou estranheza, pois a política bra-
sileira se move sob a égide da hipocrisia.
Nunca se diz o que deve ser dito. As coi-
sas nunca são apresentadas como real-
mente são. A farsa e a mentira prevale-
cem. Bolsonaro é apenas a face radica-
lizada da histórica cultura da hipocri-
sia política no Brasil. Aqui, os hipócri-
tas não precisam de esforço para dissi-
mular ou fingir, pois sabem que, quan-
do quase todos os gatos são pardos, ne-
nhum acusa ou denuncia o outro.


Pois bem: Michel Temer é um traidor
do Brasil e de seu povo. Socorreu outro
traidor da pátria, que é Bolsonaro. Não é
a primeira vez: em 1999, quando Bolsona-
ro propôs fuzilar o então presidente Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso e mais “uns 30
mil”, foi socorrido e salvo da cassação por
Temer. Em nenhum país democrático do
mundo um parlamentar que propusesse
fuzilar um presidente ou primeiro-mi-
nistro ficaria com seu mandato. Naquela
ocasião, Temer traiu a democracia, a deis-
cência, o decorro parlamentar e a própria
Câmara dos Deputados.


vavelmente a maior, consistiu em enga-
nar a presidenta Dilma Rousseff e o PT,
partido com o qual tinha feito uma alian-
ça em nome do PMDB. Seu comparsa de
traições, Eduardo Cunha, testemunhou
que Temer liderava as articulações do
impeachment-golpe três meses antes do
processo. Segundo Cunha, não foi uma
participação qualquer: Temer foi líder da
conspiração que levou à deposição de Dil-
ma, mergulhou o Brasil numa crise polí-
tica interminável e proporcionou a vitó-
ria de Bolsonaro em 2018.


Não contente com a sua traição, como
presidente-usurpador, Temer também en-
ganou os trabalhadores brasileiros, enca-
minhando uma reforma que tirou direi-
tos e agravou o desemprego e a pobreza.
A reforma foi contra o espírito e a letra da
Constituição de 1988, assentados na ga-
rantia de direitos, não só civis e políticos,
como também sociais. A Constituição co-
locou-se em linha com a Declaração de Di-
reitos da ONU, ao entender que os direitos
sociais e trabalhistas também integram os
Direitos Humanos.


Agora, Temer deu mais um passo na
sua ignominiosa história de vilanias e
traições. Apresentou-se como um es-
pírito maligno para proteger o grande
mal que é Bolsonaro. Salvou Bolsona-
ro, que converteu o Brasil numa vas-
ta arena de ódios, um vale de intrigas e
mentiras, uma necrópole onde são se-
pultados os corpos e os sonhos de qua-
se 600 mil pessoas que não tiveram o
socorro e os cuidados necessários que
o Estado e o governo tinham a obriga-
ção de lhes prestar. O Brasil tornou-se
essa necrópole onde não são sepultados
apenas corpos, mas o próprio espírito
moral da nação, degradada por um pre-
sidente indigno, vil, insensível e impie-
doso, que debocha dos vivos e dos mor-
tos e trai diariamente a Constituição.


Temer associa-se criminosamente a
essa traição. Se Temer fosse constitu-
cionalista, denunciaria as violações que
Bolsonaro perpetra. Socorremo-nos
aqui de Ulysses Guimarães. Ao promul-
gar a Constituição disse: “Quanto a ela
(a Constituição), discordar, sim. Diver-
gir, sim. Descumprir, jamais. Afrontá-la,
nunca. Traidor da Constituição é traidor
da Pátria. Conhecemos o caminho maldi-
to: rasgar a Constituição, trancar as por-
tas do Parlamento, garrotear a liberda-
de, mandar os patriotas para a cadeia, o
exílio, o cemitério”. Logo adiante, Ulys-
ses completou dizendo que “temos ódio
à ditadura. Ódio e nojo”.


O “grande constitucionalista” Temer
dispôs-se a ajudar Bolsonaro a reabrir o
caminho maldito que leva à invasão do
STF e do Senado, ao fechamento das por-
tas do Parlamento, que aprofunda o vale
do ódio e da morte e que transforma o Bra-
sil num deserto moral.


Enquanto Temer se especializou na ar-
te da traição, Bolsonaro se especializou
na arte da esperteza dos covardes. Foi in-
disciplinado no Exército, chegando a pre-
parar atentados terroristas. Expulso pe-
lo Exército foi salvo pelo Superior Tribu-
nal Militar. Ao ameaçar fuzilar FHC e mi-
lhares de brasileiros, foi salvo por Temer.
Ao defender torturadores, ditadores, pro-
ferir injúrias raciais e ofender mulheres,
sempre contou com a complacência dos
liberais e das esquerdas. O próprio FHC
confessou recentemente que não o leva-
va a sério. Quem acredita agora na boa-
-fé da sua carta à nação? É mais uma far-
sa da sua esperteza criminosa. Bolsonaro
precisa ser destituído e Temer precisa ser
designado por aquilo que é: um traidor da
Constituição e da Pátria. •

CARTA CAPITAL