Why Russian radios in Ukraine are getting spammed with heavy metal

 ONE OF THE many surprising failures of the Russian invasion force in Ukraine has been in radio communications. There have been stories of troops resorting to commercial walkie-talkies and Ukrainians intercepting their frequencies. This may not sound as serious as a lack of modern tanks or missiles, but it helps explain why Russian forces seem poorly co-ordinated, are falling victim to ambushes and have lost so many troops, reportedly including seven generals. What is going wrong with Russian radios?

Modern military-grade radios encrypt signals and change the frequency on which they operate many times a second, making their transmissions impossible to intercept. But many Russian forces are communicating on unencrypted high-frequency (HF) channels that allow anyone with a ham radio to eavesdrop. The Russian army does have some modern tech. It started receiving Azart radios, which have built-in encryption and can operate on much higher frequencies, in 2012. Thomas Withington, a military analyst specialising in electronic warfare, says that the Azart system seems adequate, if inferior to the equipment used by NATO forces. But there are not enough radios to go around. Russian news reports have talked enthusiastically about deliveries of a few hundred radios shipped to whole army groups comprising several thousand troops. By the most optimistic estimates only a fraction of the invasion force could have Azart radios.

Nor is it clear if Azart works as intended. Developing a reliable and secure system is tricky. The British army experienced compatibility problems and delays with its new Bowman radios in the 2000s, and America wasted billions of dollars on its Joint Tactical Radio System, which was designed to replace a patchwork of different systems with a single one. Parts of the programme were eventually cancelled. Mr Withington is doubtful whether the Russian procurement system is as efficient as its Western counterparts, and corruption is endemic. The Azart project was embroiled in a scandal when supposedly Russian-made components were found to have been imported from China. About a third of the total procurement budget of 18.5bn roubles (around $240m at the time) was allegedly embezzled.

Russia has other radios, but Azart may not be compatible with them. If an elite airborne unit has modern Azart radios but the artillery supporting it is using legacy systems or commercial sets, the two will end up communicating via unsecure HF. Photographs of captured military equipment, and verified intercepts, indicate that Russians are using Motorola, Kenwood and Baofeng walkie-talkies. An integrated system gives a commander instant voice communication, location details and data exchange with neighbouring units, artillery, air support and reconnaissance drones. Walkie-talkies are much too basic to support such co-ordinated operations.

Ukrainian defenders have been sharing known military frequencies, recording Russian communications and uploading to them for volunteers to transcribe and parse for information. Some of these supposed radio intercepts sound like Ukrainian propaganda. These include conversations in which Russian commanders report that half their troops are suffering from frostbite, that they do not have enough transport for all their dead or that they are being hit by friendly fire. But many seem genuine. Mr Withington says that some have been matched with actions on the ground, giving them credibility. In one recording troops in an armoured column can be heard saying they have been “ambushed” as their vehicles come under fire.

It is not just what the Russians are saying that can compromise them. Older radios can be tracked using radio-direction finding—such as triangulating the source of a transmission from two receivers—and insecure radio may be jammed. There are reports of frequencies used by Russian forces being bombarded with heavy-metal music or other transmissions from Ukrainian operators, sometimes during combat. Meanwhile NATO aircraft flying near Ukraine’s western borders are hoovering up radio signals from Russian forces. And the West will provide Ukraine with more equipment to locate, intercept and jam Russian communications.

Radio problems may also be indirectly killing Russian generals and other commanders. The frustrating lack of communication from units leading the stalled advance compels senior officers to go forward in person and become targets. In one instance, Ukrainian forces claimed they identified and located a Russian general, whom they then killed, because he was communicating over an unencrypted channel. Radios may be less lethal than weapons, but Russia’s failure to invest in its communications is hobbling its forces.

THE ECONOMIST